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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the end-of-life markets for NiCd batteries and Aluminum Intensive
Vehicles (AIVs) through an industrial ecology framework. Case studies were chosen to
examine the general characteristics of the industrial ecology of metals, barriers and incentives
to closing material loops, and policy interventions associated with loop closing.
The NiCd case shows how industry policy and public policy converge towards creation of an
environmentally beneficial end-of-life market. The industry coordinated take back program
was motivated by public health concern for cadmium landfill contamination. The main
barriers to taking back batteries are low consumer participation, insufficient economic
incentive for cadmium recovery, and ambiguous industry motivations. Public policy makers
should consider subsidizing recycled cadmium prices and adding serious accountability
measures to the take back system (such as a tax per unit under a recycle rate goal).
The AIV case demonstrates the effectiveness of material value economic incentives for
creating and maintaining a self-sufficient recycling system. However, the current recycling
system built for steel automobiles will not most efficiently recycle AIVs. Barriers to efficient
recycling include inadequate aluminum alloy sorting technology and lack of coordination
between firms. Public policy options are limited because recycling efficiency regulation is
outside the enabling legislation of agencies, but government should assist industry
coordination as much as possible.
The case studies also speak generally to loop closing policies that affect either the supply or
demand for recycled material. Demand increasing policies (procurement, minimum recycled
content, etc.) are more appropriate for recycling systems where a functional system is in
place and the last user has sufficient incentive to return the product. On the other hand,
supply increasing policies (take back, landfill ban, etc.) may be necessary for products where
the last user does not have sufficient incentive to deliver the used product to the recycling
system. Industry policy is useful for developing mutually beneficial technology, setting
product standards, and coordinating behavior through merger and acquisition.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction to the Thesis
Questions of material use are fundamental to economic and environmental performance,
which makes them ripe for public policy consideration. The cases studied in this thesis are
no exception. Policy makers in the US Environmental Protection Agency are particularly
concerned with controlling the fate of toxic or otherwise environmentally harmful materials.
The Love Canal incident, a whole neighborhood had built on top of a toxic dumpsite,
brought national attention to problems of irresponsible materials handling. Policy response
to Love Canal and other similar situations led to statutory enactment of a several laws and a
corresponding increase in the scope and importance of the US EPA.
A case chosen for this thesis looks at nickel cadmium batteries and studies public concern
for toxic releases to the environment. Several critical policy questions face the United States
and other NiCd battery consuming countries. The most drastic measure would call for
banning nickel cadmium batteries entirely. More moderate proposals include mandatory
take backs. Implementation of take back systems can be government or industry led, and
must incorporate a whole host of incentives to encourage desired behavior. The industry led
take back in the United States begs questions of private organizations' accountability to
adequately providing public goods.
The US EPA is sometimes caught in an administrative dilemma because its mission is to
protect the natural environment, while many unregulated aspects account for significant
impacts. As a result, they have taken steps with the Department of Energy to increase
energy efficiency in building design, industry operations, etc. The aluminum intensive
automobile case focuses on increasing recycling system efficiency. However, traditional
policy instruments are limited since this is an unregulated goal, raising questions about the
structure of our regulatory system to handle these situations.
1.2. Industrial Ecology of Metals
There is a lot of rhetoric surrounding the idea that "waste = food." Chemical engineers
have used this idea extensively in the design of facilities for many years, where waste streams
of one process serve as input streams to another process. But the practice of 1950's style
chemical engineering, while certainly resource efficient, is not often associated with
"industrial ecology." This begs the question, what is the difference between resource
efficiency and industrial ecology?
Graedel and Allenby defined industrial ecology as "the study of the means by which
humanity can deliberately and rationally approach and maintain a desirable carrying capacity,
given continued economic, cultural and technological evolution." (Graedel and Allenby
1998) This statement has serious implications, namely that the world has limited resources
for a given set of current and foreseeable technologies. Thus, industrial ecology is a
framework for operating within limited resources.
Graedel and Allenby's vision is significantly different than desiring the chemical engineer's
idea of resource efficiency. Industrial ecology pierces through modern day rhetoric of "win-
win" for business and environment, or "eco-efficiency." Rather, this framework is meant to
force citizens of the planet to reconceive standard neo-classical economic views of resources,
and the need to plan for their use throughout desired human development.
The industrial ecology of metals is the practice of using metal resources efficiently and
planning for a resource-constrained world. Experts in the field of industrial ecology have
suggested several guidelines in the practice of resource efficiency (Kirchain 1999):
" Dematerialization - More efficient use of a given material for a given function
" Materials Substitution - Replacement of current materials for those less scarce
and more benign
" Repair, reuse, remanufacture, and recycling
" Waste mining - Use of waste streams as inputs to other processes
Resource efficiency is often accompanied by economic gain because it involves advanced
technology utilization or incremental development. However, there comes a point when
current and foreseeable technology cannot achieve certain resource efficiency levels - the
"win-win"5 opportunities run out. Planning for a resource-constrained world where
technology cannot solve scarcity problems generates the most controversy arises. This kind
of planning might force us to reduce resource consumption, even if the resources are being
used efficiently. In other words, we may have make conscientious tradeoffs between
consumption and conservation.
The industrial ecology of metals describes metal intensive products and their ecology-like
material flows. This thesis also focuses on the end-of-life market in particular. There are
several characteristics that make metals an interesting subset of industrial ecology:
" Ubiquitous - Metals are used in many common products, and there are
important products where the metallic fraction of total mass is quite high; e.g.,
automobile, white goods, cans, etc.
" High material value - Many metals are the product of sophisticated refining
processes.
* High value-added capacity - Metals have the ability to be made into very valuable
products.
" High value-to-volume ratio - One of the limiting factors in materials flows is the
transportation costs between economic actors. Recycling becomes less feasible if
transportation costs become a high percentage of the total cost structure. A high
value-to-volume ratio allows for cheaper transport of bulk goods.
" Persistence - Metals maintain composition and integrity despite great
temperature ranges and other conditions, allowing for greater flexibility during
processing. This also gives additional incentives to manage material wastes in the
case of toxic metals.
* Similar environmental concerns - Metals are a concern to the environment for
usually one of two reasons, either they are inherently toxic or their refining
process has adverse consequences.
1.3. Recycling Options
In the context of industrial ecology, industrial systems are often looked at in terms material
loops. Materials originate from primary fabricators, are used for various products, return for
secondary processing through recycling systems, and are sold again to the product
manufacturers. In this sense, materials travel through value-added industrial loops - total
lifecycles.
Material lifecycles are often described in the context of a certain product, such as an
automobile. Lifecycles are divided into two loop sections, upstream and downstream. The
upstream section describes raw material extraction, product manufacture, distribution, and
consumption. The downstream section describes collection, processing, and disposal
options. Downstream systems are synonymous with the end-of-life market and recycling
system. Downstream systems are the main subject of this thesis, although interrelationships
with upstream activities sometimes factor into the analysis.
Downstream recycling activities are described as either "open loop" or "closed loop."
Technically, the difference is relatively simple. Closed loop recycling takes material from a
given product and recycles that material so that it is used again for the same product, closing
the loop on the product's material lifecycle. Open loop recycling allows material to be
recycled into other products and uses.
For example, closed loop Pb recycling would take lead-acid car batteries and re-smelt the
lead to be used in new lead-acid batteries. Ideally, the only system leak would be fugitive
emissions from the smelting process. Closed loop recycling has intuitive appeal because it
says we only need a one-time infusion of material to create a self-sustaining value-added
chain. On the other hand, open loop recycling could take leaded cathode rays tubes, recycle
them, and make leaded glass for X-ray laboratories. Open loop recycling has intuitive appeal
because it allows lowest cost recycling, where material takes the most economically feasible
pathway.
While the technical difference is simple, the two types of recycling have very different
philosophical foundations in industrial ecology. Closed loop recycling is often held as the
panacea of product sustainability, since it forces society to find a self-sustaining material loop
technological solution for every product. However, open loop advocates often cite an
efficiency argument. Namely, open loop recycling allows for more efficient solutions, thus
increasing the likelihood of industry participation. Open loop recycling is a more practical
policy option for material diffusion problems such as the cathode ray example, where it is
difficult to separate lead from glass.
Philosophical differences take hold in political debates over the role of industrial ecology in
economic planning and environmental policy. The next section outlines policy objectives
from a private and public perspective. Rhetoric of open loop vs. closed loop recycling
underlies many debates in this field.
1.4. Policy Frameworks
Studying the industrial ecology of metals is not useful without consideration of policy
objectives. The policy framework of this thesis uses both public policy and corporate
industry policy. Industrial ecology-based planning is a mixture of both private and public
objectives, and finding common policy objectives is crucial to developing a stable end-of-life
management system. Private goals do not always coincide with public policy, which creates
tension between regulated entities and their regulators. This thesis acknowledges such
tension and will address points of policy divergence.
Corporate industry policy is the coordinated effort of two or more private enterprises
towards a common goal. Industry policy is developed and operationalized with industry
sector issues in mind. This type of policy utilizes formal and informal institutions, such as
trade associations, partnerships, alliances, or mergers to further its interests. While industry
policy addresses many different issues and is hard to generalize, industry is often looking for
ways to: standardize operations, anticipate political changes, share financial risk, gain
economies of scale, or create reliable information.
Public policy goals transcend private sector oriented objectives by looking at social welfare
maximization. Public policy is loosely defined as the pursuit of social welfare maximization.
The public policy framework used in this thesis is based on current United States policy
experience, where mixed social agendas compete for resources. A common mixed social
agenda is the tension between neoclassical economic theory and Rawlsian political
philosophy. Where the former attempts to maximize aggregate welfare, the latter attempts
to equalize distribution of welfare.
1.5. Policy Rationale for Intervention - Three Market Problems
One common policy goal is the creation and stabilization of markets for recyclates. In
addition, both corporate industry policy and public policy seek to maximize resource use
efficiency. While these are common goals, the means and distribution of costs and benefits
are greatly debated. Most policies are first approached from a partial or general equilibrium
economic framework, analyzing supply and demand relationships.
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" is supposed to allow free markets to allocate resources most
efficiently. The invisible hand encourages recycling insofar as the "composition of demand
effect" makes consumers move to products made with recycled goods because they are
cheaper (if they are indeed cheaper). (Tietenberg 1992) But the theoretical basis for
recycling also makes intuitive sense since recycling increases the effective available stock
across time, thus increasing asset value.
Consider a stock "A" of recyclable metal and suppose a recycling rate "a" (0 < a < 1.0).
Then the effective size of this metal's stock is a sum of an infinite series: A in the first year,
A * a the second year, A * a2 the third year, etc. (Tietenberg 1992)
Total Stock Size of Recyclable Metal = A + A*a + A*a- + ... = A/(1-a)
For a metal with a 50% recycling rate, the stock size will be twice the original level. A 90%
recycling rate does even better, creating an effective stock size ten times the original!
Therefore, an efficient market supplies only enough virgin metal to replenish demand after
accounting for the recycling. Free markets have not tended to allocate recyclable material
efficiently due to three common market failure problems.
First, the incentive structure for those supplying virgin materials and those supplying
recycled materials is different. Primary producers are usually in the business of mining ore,
refining, smelting, and distributing virgin material. On the other hand, secondary recyclers
have complicated logistical problems in transportation and collection. They both compete
for the same customers, but have very different cost structures. Free market competition
between primary and secondary producers may easily lead to oversupply, analogous to other
commodity markets. A plausible explanation for oversupply from primary metals producers
would be the need to fill capacity utilization. Virgin metals producers operate in capital
intensive industries, where utilization is often a very important goal to achieve sufficient
returns. In addition, governments have subsidized and supported primary metals
manufacturing, but neglected many of the secondary markets.
The second problem, often cited in the field of environmental policy, is accounting for
"externalities." Externalities are welfare reducing (or increasing) effects that are not
accounted for in the price of a good - the price does not reflect its social value. (Pindyck and
Rubenfeld 1998) This means a consumer does not pay for the true cost of a good, they
either pay too much or too little.
Two types of externalities exist with respect to end-of-life metal materials. First, many
people perceive that we consume landfill capacity too quickly (where capacity is either
physical space or ability to absorb toxic material). Landfill users do not pay for the real cost
because of environmental externalities from groundwater contamination, ugly landscape, etc.
Landfill pricing schemes lead to inefficient disposal levels. Municipal governments often
charge a fixed fee to keep administration costs down. Thus, households have little incentive
to dispose less than their "quota." Households also have little incentive to filter out
hazardous waste because municipalities do not check garbage content. In either case, landfill
capacity will be overused.
Figure 1.4a. shows how free markets will result in M, scrap disposal, where marginal cost of
recycling (MCR) intersects marginal cost of disposal (MC). This level exceeds the efficient
market recycling rate (M*), where the marginal social cost (MSC) intersects the marginal cost
of recycling (MCR). The marginal cost (MC) curve must be shifted up in order to achieve
the market efficient recycling rate. The basic lesson is that intervention is necessary where
social costs have diverged from private costs.
Figure 1.4a. The Efficient Amount of Recycling (Pindyck and Rubenfeld 1998)
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The second externality is defined more broadly. In general, many people believe that we do
not pay for the real cost of deforestation, habitat loss, water pollution, and other
environmental ills related to ore extraction and metal smelting. Effectively, this puts
recycled material at a competitive disadvantage with respect to virgin material.
The third market problem leading to inefficient distribution of market resources is based on
an economies of scale argument. (Chen 1995) Many capital intensive industries exhibit
economies of scale because fixed costs are much larger than variable costs. Therefore, the
additional variable costs become a smaller faction of the total production cost as production
levels increase. In other words, marginal cost of production goes down as production
increases. Figure 1.4b. shows this effect in graphical form.
Figure 1.4b. Critical Throughput - Economies of Scale Argument
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Recycling operations often follow this form of production curve since transportation costs
and processing costs are usually capital intensive or have high initial costs. Policy
intervention is intended to coordinate industry behavior so that critical throughput is
reached in a relatively quick time horizon, minimizing unprofitable activity. This curve can
also be interpreted as a function of network externalities (an individual's demand is affected
by the demand of others). The proper system infrastructure will not develop if few people
recycle, but the system will "mature" into a profitable enterprise once recycling becomes a
norm or industry standard. Curbside recycling, for example, would be very costly if only a
few people participated because the municipal government has to invest in specialized
trucks, bins, and logistical management.
1.6. Policy Objectives
There are two main policy objective categories given the need for public or industry policy
intervention. Policy objectives are geared toward either shifting the demand or shifting the
supply in a way that creates lower market clearing prices for recycled material or higher
supply quantities. Figure 1.5a. shows how policy intervention can either "push" or "pull"
market behavior. (Chen 1995)
Figure 1.5a. Recycling Economics
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The supply shift is a policy intervention that increases the amount of recycled material, thus
pushing the curve up. Take back mandates and landfill bans are two common methods of
increasing the supply, "pushing" material into the end-of-life system. On the other hand,
demand-side policy increases the effective demand for recycled material, or "puffing"
material out of the end-of-life system (see Figure 1.5b.). The assumption behind both of
these policies is that intervention will drive technological change, forcing industry to adopt
more efficient technological solutions to recycling. (Chen 1995)
Figure 1.5b. Push-Pull Thinking
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However, increased technology utilization or incremental change is not sufficient because
policies will result in more costly operations. The goal of policy intervention is to create
dynamic efficiency solutions through technological innovation and breakthroughs. The
aluminum beverage can is an excellent example where policy intervention led to
technological change in can composition. The result was a more recyclable can, lowering
recycling costs for processors, and dramatically changing the feasibility of aluminum
recycling.
In addition to policy instruments mentioned in the diagram above, deposits, taxes, subsidies,
and price supports could be utilized to change material value. Analysis of these policies is
not given general attention here, but will follow after presentation of the two case studies.
Collected
Materials
1.7. Case Study Selection
Comprehensively studying the industrial ecology of metals would require extensive analysis
on most major metal intensive products, which is far beyond the scope of a master's thesis.
Case selection considered objectives of industrial ecology and tries to find some degree of
generalization.
There seems to be two major thrusts for resource conservation. First, industrial ecology
seeks to minimize the associated impacts of material use through "dematerialization." In
other words, less aluminum needed for a given function corresponds to less energy
requirements and emissions of toxic by-products. The aluminum intensive automobile was
chosen to capture a focus on dematerialization and material substitution. The ubiquitous
nature of aluminum and the automobile also force policy makers to face general questions
about resource conservation and limits to human impact on the environment.
The second major thrust of resource conservation is to ininmize direct environmental
impacts of materials in the biological impact pathway. In many cases, this involves taking
emissions of one production source and using it as a useful input to another process -
"waste mining." The case of nickel cadmium batteries was chosen to focus on this aspect of
industrial ecology. Neither nickel nor cadmium are resource scare metals, but both have
serious direct health and environmental consequences in their end-of-life fate (especially
when compared to steel or aluminum). The nickel cadmium battery is very difficult to
dematerialize because its energy storage function is closely tied the mass of each metal.
Both case studies focus on the most important aspect of end-of-life materials management,
the recycling system. Recycling systems are complex because of their non-linear
relationships. Many businesses think in terms of a supplier-producer-distributor-customer
relationship, but a vibrant recycling system can complicate this dynamic. Producers' design
choices can affect disposal options, which then change material markets, altering suppliers'
economics, which then allow producers to obtain cheaper input material, etc.
Interdependencies between economic actors make decision analysis difficult. This thesis will
explore complexity in the end-of-life market dynamics.
While both case studies have active end-of-life markets, it is hard to imagine two recycling
systems that could be more different. The automobile recycling system is an economics-
driven system and self-sustaining. Regulatory pressure stems from general landfill and
resource concerns, not targeted policy intervention. On the other hand, nickel cadmium
battery recycling is a recent industrial policy initiative, subsidized by producers, and subject
to the threat of targeted policy intervention.
1.8. Outline of Thesis
The next two chapters describe case studies of the nickel cadmium battery and the aluminum
intensive automobile. Case studies attempt a general approach to understanding the end-of-
life markets - industry context, technology, and macroeconomic variables are explored.
Sankey diagrams will show estimated metals flow through the economy. Chapter 4 is an
analysis of the recycling systems, utilizing a basic econometric matrix to outline relationships
between actors. Comparisons are drawn between the two cases, with attention given to the
public policy context. Chapter 5 will describe how standard policy options might affect
recycling systems. The thesis concludes with a few comments on the industrial ecology of
metals and lessons learned from these cases. Specifically, the cases suggest that pull policy is
more appropriate for established recycling systems, and push policies are effective for
retrieving materials where no formal prior recycling system exists. A set of public policy
options are recommended to enhance the recycling systems' efficiency
CHAPTER 2 - NICKEL CADMIUM BATTERY
Nickel cadmium battery recycling is nearing its sixth year of concerted effort. The battery
industry's self-led initiative is an innovative approach to end-of-life product management,
spawning praise from environmentalists and government alike. However, the take back
system hasn't met its promised goals. Promised recycling rates of 70% have not been
achieved, and target dates are continually pushed back.
Should more regulation have been promulgated, or was this really "one of those cases where
government simply needed to get out of the way." (Rep. Scott L. Kiug, R-Wisconsin, chief
sponsor of the "Battery Act"). (Daniels 1996) Do recycling systems need more than six
years to achieve desirable recycling rates? Or will the nickel cadmium problem be solved by
its shrinking market share to nickel metal hydride and lithium ion substitutes?
2.1. Basics of Nickel Cadmium Batteries
2.1.1. Characteristics of the Nickel-Cadmium Battery
"Nicads" are one of several popular rechargeable, or secondary batteries. Primary batteries
are single discharge cells, such as alkaline types used in many electronics. Secondary
batteries, on the other hand, operate on a reversible chemical reaction. The typical
composition of a NiCd battery is given below.
Table 2.1.1. - A Typical Composition of the NiCd Battery (Lankey 1998)
Material Weight (%)
Nickel 20.20
Nickel Hydroxide 17.40
Cadmium 24.60
Cobalt 1.40
Steel and copper terminals 4.10
Lithium Hydroxide 0.70
Potassium Hydroxide 5.22
Water 11.48
Case and cover (stainless steel) 11.70
Miscellaneous plastics 3.10
Other 0.10
Total ] 100
Electric power is supplied by the ion exchange between nickel and cadmium plates
(electrodes). An electrolyte (LiOH or KOH) is stuffed between plates and carries charges
between the two plates. Many other technical modifications have been developed to
enhance various performance characteristics of the battery.
2.1.2. Commercial applications
Most NiCd batteries are purchased indirectly through semi-durable electronics, such as
cordless power tools and portable communication devices (cordless phones). The other
sizable market is for industrial grade power supplies in trains, light rail, and emergency
lighting. Nickel cadmium batteries have found a strong niche market for low-cost high
power delivery services. They are projected to serve the needs of products used in extreme
climactic conditions. (Lankey 1998) Table 2.1.2. shows the distribution of applications in
the Japanese battery market from 1996, with approximate increasing or decreasing trends
indicated.
The important consideration with respect to end-of-life management is that NiCd batteries
are not often primary products, but rather an added cost to the product being purchased.
This has broad ramifications for designing effective policies to facilitate take back. For
example, consumers may not notice educational labels, or electronics manufacturers may
oppose deposit-type strategies since higher product pricing may reduce electronic device
sales.
Table 2.1.2. - 1996 Distribution in Japanese NiCd Sales
by Application (Lankey 1998)
Application 10' Cells % Trend
Home Appliances 64 28 Stable
Office Equipment 15 7 N/A
Communications 43 19 Decreasing
Power Tools 51 22 Increasing
Round Cells 14 6 N/A
Emergency Lighting 25 11 Increasing
Other (industrial) 16 7 Increasing
Total 228 100 (Overall 2-4%
growth per year)
2.1.3. Market position in the battery industry
The overall market size for rechargeable batteries has been increasing with the proliferation
of portable electronic devices. Nickel cadmium batteries benefit from several desirable
aspects: durability, reliable performance across temperature ranges, excellent rechargeability,
fast power delivery, and cost-effectiveness. Nonetheless, other battery types have made
quite an impressive dent in the NiCd market, notably the Lithium-ion and Nickel metal
hydride battery. These both weigh considerably less, which has been an important consumer
preference in the laptop computer and cellular phone markets.
NiCd batteries had established a very strong initial position in the rechargeable battery
market, but now are facing serious competition. Because other batteries are competing very
closely, we might expect to see marginal considerations swing consumer choice. Brown and
Klein estimate that NiCd battery market share has decreased 15% (in relative terms) because
of environmental concerns alone. (Brown and Klien 1997)
The market for rechargeable batteries is splitting into two segments - price-sensitive and
performance-sensitive applications. Performa"-sensitiw applications include the laptop
computer and mobile phone, where every extra operational minute derived from higher
quality batteries (such as Lithium ion) is worth the extra cost. Prix-sursitiw applications favor
NiCd batteries because the low selling price is important in highly competitive markets, such
as cordless household phones and rechargeable flashlights. (Margolin 1995)
Assuming NiCd batteries currently have a ten percent market share (Lankey 1998), it is not
expected that NiCd share would fall below five percent of the total battery market because
industrial and cordless power tool applications lack economical substitutes. These two
applications alone constitute roughly 5 0% of the current NiCd market, and the market for
industrial batteries is expected to grow at 10% per year. Another prediction from the
International Cadmium Association is that nickel cadmium batteries will be one of several
power supply choices for electric vehicles. Even a modest electric vehicle market share
would increase NiCd production by a factor of ten. (Metal Bulletin 1995) Thus, the
materials management question is not "how do we get rid of it," but rather "how do we deal
with it."
2.2. Material Flows
2.2.1. Cadmium
Cadmium is mostly found in a zinc-ore at low concentrations (0.3% to 0.5%), and is a by-
product of zinc production. Trace amounts of cadmium are also found in other ores,
making it a common low-level toxic pollutant from numerous industrial processes.
Historically, cadmium use was concentrated in electroplating operations, pigments, and
plastic stabilizers. Nickel cadmium batteries first appeared during World War I, and have
increased in use every year since then.
Cadmium material flows are diagramed in Figure 2.2.1., including leaks to the environment.
(Llewllyn 1990) While the Sankey diagram is based on 1989 and 1996 U.S. data, the general
industry profile is similar today. However, as mentioned in the previous section, battery
production is increasingly becoming the dominant sink of cadmium stock. Well over 50%
of total cadmium production is now used for batteries in the U.S. This number is even
higher for the global market at 70%. (Financial Times 1998) Figure 2.2.1. is a modification
and represents an approximation of current U.S. material flows.
Cadmium is not a highly recyclable metal given its product design and typology. For
example, cadmium bonded into pigments and plastic resins cannot be easily separated.
Likewise, if cadmium coating represents a small portion of the total product being discarded,
then it will most likely not be recycled. To date, almost all recycling has been for spent NiCd
batteries. (United States Geological Survey 1999) Of the recycled batteries, 80 to 85% are
from industrial types, which are more likely to be recycled because each unit has more
material (and thus more value). In addition, industrial batteries are not disposed through
household waste, but rather a much more regulated commercial waste stream. Estimating
the recycling rate of batteries is a very difficult calculation, involving many imprecise
assumptions. For example, different types of nickel cadmium batteries have different
lifetimes. Therefore, it is difficult to tell what year they discard their used batteries.
Figure 2.2.1. Cadmium Sankey (metric tons)
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Material flows of cadmium are significantly different in other countries. Recycling rates have
tended to be higher in Japan and Europe, not surprising considering their tighter regulatory
environment. In addition, cadmium has been banned from certain uses in Europe, such as
pigments.
2.2.2. Nickel Material Flows
Nickel is produced all over the world, with Russia leading global output. (Kuck 1997)
Stainless steel consumes 65% of the world nickel supply, with another 5% for other steel
alloys. Battery manufacturer demand represents a much smaller portion of global nickel
demand, but this number is increasing at about 6% per year. Even so, it is not a large
enough portion to be an important flow on the Sankey diagram. Demand for stainless steel
is also increasing, suggesting that battery manufacturers will not be a major consumer of
nickel in the foreseeable future. (Kuck 1997) Figure 2.2.2. is a Sankey diagram for the U.S.
material flows of nickel.
Figure 2.2.2. Nickel Sankey Diagram (metric tons)
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2.2.3. Nickel and Cadmium Pricing
Prices for both nickel and cadmium have been volatile (see Figure 2.2.3.), as with many
commodities markets. The late 1980's were a golden time for cadmium producers, with
prices well over $6.00 per pound. This shortage was caused by the rapid growth of NiCd
production. In fact, industry experts at the 1989 Sixth Cadmium Conference seriously
discussed cadmium recycling as a viable solution to high prices. With 1989 recycling
technology, $3.50 per pound would allow recyclers to break even, and $4.00 per pound
would be a "good return on investment." (DiMaria 1989)
The price elevation was short lived because macroeconomic variables (such as an oversupply
created by excess production in Russia) altered global conditions. The United States
Defense Logistics Agency also decided to dispose of its strategic stockpile of cadmium,
Fates
increasing the supply significantly. (Chemical Marketing Reporter 1994) Recycling has also
contributed approximately 11% of global production, lowering the price even more.
(Financial Times 1998) Another destabilizing effect is that cadmium production is directly
related to zinc demand and production.
Figure 2.2.3. Cadmium Prices ($/lb.)
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2.3. Biological Impact Pathway
Loosely speaking, we are concerned with energy, resource conservation, and leaks in the
lifecycle when referring to environmental concerns. The first two are assumed to be all
other things equal, desirable goals in designing policy and corporate practice; i.e., more
conservation is better. However, leaks to the lifecycle are much more difficult to
understand. If a leak causes no harm, should we care? CFCs and CO2 are two notable
examples where government and industry delayed policy action because emissions were
believed to be harmless. But this logic places a lot of trust in current scientific knowledge.
One tool for assessing harm from leaks is the "biological impact pathway." Figure 2.3.
illustrates the biological impact pathway, and how lifecycle leaks goes through complicated
interactions before final biological harm is registered. (Ashford 1980)
Figure 2.3. Biological Impact Pathway
2.3.1. Toxicity of Nickel and Cadmium
Cadmium is a toxic heavy metal. Short-term, or acute, effects include pulmonary irritation
(of the lung). However, long term effects are of the most serious concern to regulators.
Cadmium is considered to be a "probable human carcinogen of medium carcinogenic
hazard" by the US EPA. (United States Environmental Protection Agency) In addition,
cadmium is a bioaccumulative toxin in some organs, such as the kidney. Cadmium also has
teratogenic and other adverse developmental effects.
The main source of airborne exposure to cadmium comes from burning fossil fuels,
smelting, and municipal waste incineration. (United States Environmental Protection Agency
) Cadmium releases into water bodies come mostly from leaching landfills and wastewater
of cadmium-intensive industrial activities. (United States Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Water) Due to the health concerns mentioned above, cadmium is considered to
be a major environmental hazard.
While cadmium is undoubtedly a problem, nickel is often an overlooked hazard in battery
waste management. Nickel dusts are considered Group A carcinogens, making it more
carcinogenic than lead. (United States Environmental Protection Agency) Nickel also has
acute and non-carcinogenic chronic effects targeted toward the lung and kidneys, making it a
"high concern" pollutant.
Main air pathways include refinery dust, municipal incinerator air pollution, and through
food ingestion. Nickel is a water-borne pollutant through industrial wastewater and landfill
leachate. The EPA does not consider nickel in water to be an acute danger. However, long-
term exposure includes heart and liver damage, skin irritation, and decreased body weight.
Nickel does not bioaccumulate, which is different from cadmium. (United States
Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water)
2.3.2. Biological Impact Pathway of NiCd Batteries
The first step in a biological impact is discharge, or exit from commercial control. Nickel
and cadmium are released in several ways mentioned in the previous section. Incineration
and leaching of municipal waste is most pertinent to the NiCd lifecycle; and to a lesser
degree, management of industrial waste streams. Both discharge pathways are difficult to
control. Industrial waste streams employ pollution control technology to minimize
discharge quantity, but this does not prevent inevitable releases due to inherent leaks of the
manufacturing process. Discharge from municipal waste is even more difficult to control
because individual households contribute to the landfill. While regulations may ban disposal
of NiCd batteries, they are essentially unenforceable.
The next step in a biological impact pathway is the transport of nickel and cadmium from
the leaky system to populations. Incineration is a transport of metal from waste into
airborne particles, carried by air movements in the atmosphere. The US EPA uses computer
models and monitoring stations to estimate movements of air toxins. Even though the net
output of airborne heavy metals may be understood, it should be noted that determining
exactly how much is due to batteries is very difficult because of waste stream ambiguities.
Landfill leachate is difficult to understand from a transport perspective, since underground
water behaves in unpredictable ways. However, hydrological engineers have developed
methods of analyzing water movements, aided by sampling techniques. Once again,
determining how much leachate contamination is due to batteries can be almost impossible
to determine since municipal trash concentrations are unknown.
Environmental regulations have forced industry to carefully monitor emissions of cadmium
and nickel to the environment, which makes metal transport much easier to track from
industrial sources. Table 2.3.2(a) and (b) show that most of the metal released is due to
metal acquisition, followed by battery manufacturing.
Table 2.3.2(a) Cadmium Emissions by Medium per kg of
NiCd Batteries (Lankey 1998)
Medium grams Cd per kg NiCd grams Cd per kg NiCd
battery manufactured battery recycled
Air 0.11 0.00095
Water 0.031 0.00038
Land 0.25 0.019
Total 0.39 1 0.02
Table 2.3.2(b) Cadmium and Nickel Emissions per kg of
NiCd Batteries (Lankey 1998)
Life Cycle Stage g Cd g Ni
Raw materials acquisition 1.2 2.25
Battery manufacturing 0.39 0.5
Battery recycling 0.02 0.0125
Recycling batteries has a net positive effect on the environment if the recycled cadmium
replaces virgin cadmium. For example, 0.25 kg Cd is recycled per kg NiCd battery. This
saves (1.2 g * 0.25 kg Cd/g emission) = .3 g Cd from being released in raw material
acquisition, while only producing 0.02 g Cd pollution from recycling operations - a net
savings of 0.28 g Cd.
Exposure to these heavy metals is determined through behavior analysis; e.g., dermal,
ingestion, etc. The greatest concerns for these metals are through inhalation of metallic
dusts or vapors and ingestion through contaminated drinking water. Finally, the dose-
response relationship tells us what the ultimate biological impact will be. As mentioned in
the previous section, these heavy metals demonstrate several dose-response relationships:
acute, chronic, carcinogenic, and teratogenic. In addition, cadmium is bioaccumulative,
making it particularly dangerous in long-term exposure.
Practically, these metals are of great concern because municipal waste management is an area
of great controversy and uncertainty for many countries. As landfills close, citizens wonder
about leachate contamination. Alternatives to landfilling certain types of waste, such as
incineration, make batteries of particular concern. Issues of environmental justice can
exacerbate debates when incinerator facilities are located near poor or minority
neighborhoods.
2.3.3. Energy Consumption
Experts agree that most industrial systems are best designed to be energy efficient. Energy
production contributes to pollution of many forms. The traditional concern pollutants are
sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion, but even "clean" sources
such as hydroelectric contribute to ecological disruption. Windmills can be very unsightly on
a once-picturesque prairie. Thus, for the sake of this thesis, energy conservation is
considered to be a positive characteristic.
The lifecycle of NiCd batteries is an industrial system. Lankey characterized the NiCd
energy lifecycle in Figure 2.3.3., mapping resource extraction through manufacturing and
recycling. There are two important takeaways from Figure 2.3.3. First, more energy is tied
up in the use of rechargeable batteries than all other sources combined. Second, recycling
saves approximately 12.8 kilo-Watt-hours per kg NiCd batteries. These savings are
significant considering the millions of pounds of NiCd batteries produced each year.1 As a
general issue, policy makers should acknowledge these features when considering
alternatives. For example, mandating a switch to other (possibly less efficient) battery types
may result in much higher energy demands during the use stage.
Figure 2.3.3. NiCd Energy Lifecycle (kWh per kg of NiCd battery) (Lankey 1998)
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2.3.4. Resource conservation
Unlike environmental problems such as packaging waste and forest management, battery
waste management has not placed an inherent emphasis on resource conservation. Nickel
and cadmium are not analogous to trees and forest products. As an input to their product,
1 One estimate states that 1.5 billion pounds of NiCd batteries were produced by the battery industry in 1997
worldwide. Energy savings from recycled cadmium could be quite significant when aggregated across industry.
the metals are not considered ecological entities. They are not the subject of preservation
efforts. Resource conservation is usually the subject of concern because extraction is directly
correlated to metal discharge to the environment.
Financially, there are good reasons to monitor resource stocks and flows of these metals.
Nickel will most likely be a metal in high demand for quite some time because of its role in
stainless steel and alloy production. Governments are wise to manage stocks of both metals
to prevent price spikes experienced by the early 1990's cadmium market.
Cadmium presents a special form of resource conservation concern because it is a by-
product of zinc production. Supposing all commercial cadmium applications stopped
production, then zinc producers would find themselves in a peculiar position by having to
manage large quantities of cadmium-containing solid waste. Under current regulations, such
waste is considered hazardous, which in turn might drive up the price of zinc.
2.4. Industry Structure
2.4.1. Economic lifecycle of the nickel cadmium battery
The nickel cadmium battery has a closed loop lifecycle because cadmium recycled out of old
batteries is used for new batteries. This creates much more interdependence between stages
of the lifecycle. For example, dramatic increases in cadmium recycling can affect input costs
for battery manufacturers. Figure 2.4.1. illustrates the lifecycle and corresponding actors,
and will serve as the template for analyzing the nickel cadmium battery industry.
Nickel does not have a closed loop lifecycle because nickel from used batteries become
feedstock to stainless steel production.
Figure 2.4.1. NiCd Industry Economic Lifecycle
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2.4.2. Rechargeable battery manufacturing industry
The rechargeable battery industry is dominated by a small number of large producers, such
as Rayo Vac, Gillette (Duracell), Sanyo, Matsushita (Panasonic), Sony, Ralston Purina
(Energizer), and European manufacturers Saft and Varta. The industry structure went
through dramatic change in the early 1990's, marked by mergers, acquisitions, and joint
ventures. (O'Neil 1994) These companies produced the largest amount of nickel cadmium
batteries, especially those for household use. There are a large number of smaller battery
manufacturers that produce industrial and specialty nickel cadmium batteries. Larger
companies are not structured to provide services for low volume orders.
Recent technological advances have allowed some companies to change strategic position in
the rechargeable market. Duracell has made a corporate commitment to "Cadmium-Free
Rechargeable Batteries," and now produces NiMH and Li-ion. (Duracell) OEM customers
of battery manufacturers are demanding more environmentally friendly alternatives. For
example, Omnipoint Communication Services banned the use of NiCds in their personal
communication devices. (Mooney 1998) While "you get an argument from the NiCad
makers that almost everything in a NiCad battery is recycled," one Ericsson Inc. manager
retorted, "actual recycle rates are pretty low." (Mooney 1998)
Energizer still makes nickel cadmium batteries as a low cost alternative to NiMH in all their
application segments (cordless phones, camcorders, etc.). (Energizer) Energizer will not
play as important of a role in the rechargeable market because they are focusing on primary
(non-rechargeable) batteries and recently divested from their OEM (original equipment
manufacturer) business. For example, they will not be providing batteries for mobile phone
manufacturers such as Qualcomm. (Energizer 1999)
As the third largest battery manufacturer, Rayo Vac produces modest quantities of NiCd
batteries and recently acquired Direct Power Plus (DPP), a rechargeable battery company
with almost $20 million in sales. This is part of an "aggressive" growth strategy in
rechargeables, including nickel cadmium batteries. (PRNewswire 1998) Rayovac also saw the
need to produce a low cost non-cadmium rechargeable, and has spent a sizable amount on
developing a rechargeable alkaline battery called "Renewal."
However, it is Japanese companies that have been in the forefront of rechargeable battery
manufacturing. Sony, Sanyo, and Matsushita (Panasonic) have been the strategic leaders in
this industry, dominating the $5 billion market. (Financial Times Survey Edition 1999)
Other major NiCd manufacturers are Saft and Varta.
2.4.3. Consumer use of nickel cadmium batteries
Household consumers tend to purchase nickel cadmium batteries through two avenues.
First, they may buy batteries as single cells (AA, AAA, C, D, etc.) with some sort of cradle to
recharge depleted batteries. These batteries are meant substitute the ubiquitous alkaline cell.
Consumers gain by not having to purchase new batteries, but rather can just recharge their
"old" ones. Rechargeable batteries suffer from higher initial costs, discouraging consumers
with short financial time horizons. Another drawback is that some consumers perceive a
high information cost on learning how to use rechargeables. Common distribution routes
for NiCd cell-type batteries would be in electronics and discount stores like Wal-Mart.
The other type of nickel cadmium battery is the "battery pack." Packs are usually
manufactured in more unique shapes for particular applications in specific brands or devices;
e.g., the batteries in laptop computers and mobile phones. Their business strategy is much
different than selling cell-types to household consumers since battery manufacturers are
making the product for OEMs,. The OEM may demand different characteristics or prices
depending on whether the electrical device is price or performance-sensitive. Distribution
routes would be similar to the distribution route of whatever electronic device is being
purchased. Moreover, the battery price is often incorporated into the device price, making it
difficult for consumers to exercise demand preferences across battery-sensitive
characteristics. The Rechargeable Battery Recycling Corporation offers the following data
on discards and recycling rates of non-industrial batteries in Table 2.4.3.
Table 2.4.3. U.S. and Canada Consumption and
Recycling of NiCd (non-industrial) batteries (lb.) 2 (RBRC 1998)
Year Total Recyclable RBRC RBRC Pounds Rate
Pounds Entering Market Batteries in Batteries
Waste Stream Penetration Waste Stream Recycled
1993 14,221,000 -- -- 284,000 2%
1994 15,760,000 -- -- 630,000 4%
1995 17,921,000 -- -- 2,703,000 15%
1996 20,542,000 -- -- 3,078,000 15%
1997 22,454,000 75% 16,840,500 3,782,000 22%
1998 23,231,000 80% 18,584,800 4,646,200 25%
1999 26,330,000 81% 21,327,300 6,398,190 30%
2000 27,917,000 82% 22,891,940 8,012,179 35%
2001 28,242,000 83% 23,440,860 9,376,344 40%
2002 28,199,000 84% 23,687,160 11,843,580 50%
2003 28,032,000 85% 23,827,200 14,296,320 60%
2004 28,035,000 86% 24,110,100 16,877,070 70%
2005 28,027,000 87% 24,383,290 19,506,792 80%
2 Shaded areas represent estimates given in 1998.
Another type of consumer is the industrial purchaser, which may be through OEM or direct
from the battery manufacturer. Large nickel cadmium batteries are common back-up
supplies for trains. Their cost would most likely be incorporated into the train's overall
price. On the other hand, hospital back-up power supplies are another common NiCd
application. These might be sold as individual batteries to the hospital administration.
Industrial applications are less performance sensitive because weight is not a dominant
consumer preference.
2.4.4. Nickel Cadmium battery recycling technology
Recycling plays a large role in the industrial and regulatory analysis of nickel cadmium
batteries since it fundamentally changes economic and environmental interactions. Its
importance is well stated in a 1995 article on the rechargeable battery industry. (Margolin
1995)
"When it appeared that NiCd batteries might be withdrawn from the market
because of landfill-contamination hazards they posed, the price premium for
NiMH batteries was not an issue. But now that practical recycling programs
have been implemented and government regulations appear to be easing,
NiCd batteries are likely here to stay."
Nickel cadmium batteries are recycled in only a handful of locations around the world. Inco
Ltd., a large nickel metal fabricator, owns a subsidiary company called the International
Metals Reclamation Company (INMETCO). INMETCO is the only recycling facility in
North America that can recover cadmium in a re-usable form. There are other facilities in
Japan, Austria, Germany, Australia, and France. The French recycler, SNAM, has a capacity
of 5,200 tons, and is very active in the European NiCd recycling market. (Haznews 1996)
INMETCO receives spent nickel cadmium batteries in 50-gallon drums and through the
mail. The batteries must be separated by hand to ensure feedstock consistency. A major
determining factor for the value of the recycled metal is final purity quality.
Cadmium from the recycling operation is used to make nickel cadmium batteries again
making a closed loop with the cadmium material flow (see Figure 2.4.4.). Nickel and iron
material in the battery is eventually mixed with other metal to make a stainless steel product.
The electrolyte is used in INMETCO's wastewater treatment facility to neutralize chemicals
from other operations. A new $5 million operation was installed in 1995, which made
cadmium recovery feasible. The new thermal processing essentially vaporizes cadmium and
recollects it in solid form, leaving a nickel-iron scrap behind. This is possible because the
melting point of cadmium is lower than the nickel-iron metal. (INMETCO 2000) The
following diagram illustrates the material flow in this battery processor. (Lankey 1998)
Figure 2.4.4. Battery Processing Flow (Lankey 1998)
2.4.5. Nickel Cadmium battery recycling economics
As the quote in Section 2.4.4. may suggest, survival of the nickel cadmium battery industry
hinges on its ability to assuage regulators - notably, finding a politically viable solution to
cadmium recycling. INMETCO received a $100,000 grant from the Pennsylvania Solid
Waste-Resource Act to develop a technology for recycling (adapted from the French recycler
SNAM). The thermal processing technology was revolutionary in its ability to recover
cadmium as a useful product. $5,000,000 was invested in a 3,000-ton capacity cadmium
recovery facility. (Goodwin 1995)
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INMETCO already operates stainless steel waste processing, so they had existing nickel-iron
recovery capabilities. Due to proprietary reasons, there are no publicly available cost data on
INMETCO's operations. However, INMETCO was the subject of a dissertation done by
Rebecca Lankey at Carnegie Mellon University in 1998. She developed cost and revenue
estimates based on the best available information:
Table 4.5. INMETCO Costs and Revenues (in $)
per pound NiCd battery (Lankey 1998)
Cost Revenue
Cd recovery facility operation and -0.40
maintenance
Capital related -0.17
Stainless steel processing -0.13
Return on investment -0.08
Nickel-iron-chromium containing 0.56
_product
Cadmium product 0.19
Pre-paid mailer fees' 0.10
1_Total -0.78 0.85
The price of nickel was assumed to be $2.12 per pound and $1 per pound for cadmium,
which were current estimates at the time Lankey conducted her research. Since then, the
price of cadmium has bottomed out at $0.30 per pound, down from nearly $9.00 per pound
in 1988. The price change (from $1.00 to $0.30) in price would reduce cadmium metal
revenue from $0.19 to about $0.06 per pound - or total revenue of $0.72. This is below the
cost of processing batteries, not a particularly advantageous business position.
On the other hand, nickel prices have not changed and contribute a much higher fraction of
the total revenue. INMETCO must either demand more from per-paid mailers or stop
recycling cadmium for the time being, and wait until cadmium prices are higher. Lankey
suggests another option; INMETCO could try to develop technology that would extract
trace amounts of cobalt from the batteries. Cobalt prices were about $23 per pound in 1998
3 Pre-paid mailer fees include the revenue derived from other companies when they ship battery waste to
INMETCO; i.e., INMETCO is paid to receive the waste.
and would net $0.32 per pound battery. The U.S. needs cobalt for strategic reasons since
they must import all cobalt from Africa.
2.4.6. PRBA and RBRC
Pre-paid mailers are a form of subsidy intervention into the economic lifecycle. INMETCO
would almost certainly not be in the business of recycling NiCd batteries without
subsidization. This subsidy does not necessarily come from battery manufacturers, but may
come from Compaq, Radio Shack, or Black & Decker. These subsidies are the brainchild of
the Portable Rechargeable Battery Association, formed in 1991 by five large battery
manufacturers. Their mission is to "provide leadership in obtaining consistent domestic and
international solutions to environmental and other selected issues affecting the use, recycling
and disposal of small sealed rechargeable batteries." (PRBA 2000)
Membership has increased and diversified quite a bit since 1991. There are over 80
companies representing all kinds of manufacturers and retailers in PRBA. PRBA is a trade
association representing the regulatory interests of any company interfacing with nickel
cadmium batteries. Its most important response to policy concerns was the creation of the
Rechargeable Battery Recycling Corporation (RBRC), a nonprofit organization funded by
many of the same companies in PRBA.
RBRC was formed as an organization for implementing collection, education, and
transportation programs. The group of companies in RBRC decided that cooperation,
rather than competition, was needed to successfully implement these operations. The goal
in 1995 was to raise the recycle rate of small dry cell NiCd batteries from 15% to 70%.
(Hachman 1995) Table 2.4.3. lists the accomplishments of RBRC and their projections for
the next seven years.
2.5. Take Back System
The take back system for nickel cadmium batteries did not develop through traditional free
market economic incentives. The system was a construct of centralized planning by the
battery manufacturing and portable electronics industry. Although industry does not cite
regulatory concern as the motivation for initiating this take back, most literature agrees that
it was created to preemptively establish an industry-led recycling effort before political
pressures would result in limiting regulation. Figure 2.5. outlines basic transactions in this
take back system, with the shaded area representing RBRC-subsidized activity through the
"Charge Up To Recycle" campaign. The next seven sections describe the details in this
system.
Figure 2.5. NiCd Take Back System
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2.5.1. Overview of RBRC corporate activity
RBRC has two divisions, one that manages collection and education logistics through
independent contractors, and another that administers the seal licenses and finances. In
1996, RBRC spent $0.8 million on administration and $4.7 million on logistics and
education. Given 2,500 tons recycled, the average cost to recycle NiCd batteries is $2200 per
ton. This is approximately the same cost cited by municipal solid waste handlers to have
V
battery waste disposed of via private mechanisms. The program cost represents about 1%
of the total NiCd battery sales. (Fishbein 1997)
RBRC signed a five-year contract with INMETCO making it the exclusive recycling vendor
for RBRC's spent batteries. Three companies have been contracted to serve as collection
locations: 1) Wade Environmental Industries - Atco, New Jersey; 2) US Filter Recovery
Services, Inc. - Roseville, Minnesota; 3) Kinsbursky Brothers Supply, Inc. - Anaheim,
California. (Fishbein 1997) A system of transportation companies have been contracted to
ship batteries; e.g., UPS and commercial trucking services. RBRC-funded liability and
contingent pollution insurance covers both transporters and collection service companies.
(Fishbein 1997)
2.5.2. Funding and administration
RBRC's recycling system funding comes from license fees for an "eco-label." Fees are based
on the weight (tonnage) produced in the previous calendar quarter and range from $0.04 to
$0.12 per battery. (Fishbein 1997) Participating companies have input on RBRC's budget
allocations and determine the precise fee levels. RBRC hired Hove Improamt sitcom star,
Richard Karn, to lead their $1.6 million annual marketing campaign raising awareness. (Byrd
1996)
The label is licensed on a per-battery-unit basis and effectively acts as an additional cost to
the consumer. Each individual battery has the RBRC logo (see Figure 2.5.2.). Charging
license fees may be complicated when batteries are manufactured for OEMs. In that case,
the brand name on the battery is a licensee and the brand name of the electronic device is a
sub-licensee. (Fishbein 1997) RBRC logos are found on about 80% of all nickel cadmium
batteries. (RBRC 2000)
RBRC highly encourages visible display of the seal, on both the battery and product. They
recognize that public awareness and education is necessary to program success. In the
absence of direct marketing (from Home Impronant's Richard Karn, for example), consumers
have a narrow window of attention where they notice and internalize information portrayed
on the seal.
Figure 2.5.2. RBRC Seal (RBRC 2000)
Not everybody is convinced of NiCd label effectiveness. In Germany (where there are
similar recycling efforts), one environmental official noted that labels could confuse
customer; moreover, consumers are not likely to recycle unless there is a financial incentive.
(Haznews 1997) The label may just suggest that recycled materials are in the product (such
as with paper products) or that it is recyclable - the label does not clearly address this
difference. However, RBRC's seal must walk a fine line between too much information and
too little information. The seal must also convey the need to recycle toxic metals without
making the product look toxic itself.
2.5.3. Retail collection system
Chaige Up to Royde! is RBRC's national program to collect spent nickel cadmium batteries.
In 1997, RBRC was networked to 15,000 retail collection sites. (Mooney 1997) By 1998 this
number was up to 20,000 sites, and is now at 25,000. Little information is known about the
distribution of collection volume across these sites. (Greczyn 1998) This program operates
across borders with Canadian retailers, and now has 26 participating major retail chains.
Local stores of these retail chains are incorporated in a database accessible by anyone via a 1-
800 number.
These retail sites, such as Radio Shack, Batteries Plus, and Ace Hardware, sell NiCd batteries
or products containing NiCd batteries. Each retail location saves spent batteries in 18-
pound capacity buckets. Battery buckets have prepaid labels and are picked up by UPS for
delivery. Therefore, retailers incur no direct financial cost aside from the time needed to
administer collection. RBRC has made a conscientious effort to minimize the effort
expended by retailers to participate in Charge Up to Rayde! UPS sends the buckets to the
nearest of the three consolidation points. They hold onto the batteries until 10,000 to
40,000 pounds are accumulated. The collection point operator calls a trucking service after
collecting over 10,000 pounds, and the batteries are shipped off to INMETCO with RBRC
insurance covering possible accidental spills.
2.5.4. Community collection system
Community collection sites are another part of RBRC's Chge up to Recyle! program. RBRC
hopes to take advantage of pre-existing municipal recyclable waste collection systems, such
as common curbside collection. RBRC will pay for pick-ups from one common location in
each county, provided they are at least 1,000 pounds and once per month at most. Many
municipal waste collectors use 55-gallon drums to collect batteries. (Fishbein 1997)
Municipalities incur costs from sending batteries to a single collection point in the county
and time spent on adding additional tasks to collection procedures. However, they may also
reap significant benefits. Charge Up to Reccle! allows municipal waste collectors already
collecting NiCd batteries to avoid costly disposal and treatment fees.4 For municipalities not
collecting batteries, the program saves landfills from future water pollution contingencies.
Incinerators also benefit from the need for less expensive pollution control devices to filter
out heavy metals.
4 Fishbein estimates that NiCd disposal fees could cost up to $1600 per ton. New Jersey DEP estimates that it
costs $17 million to control heavy metals from incineration emissions, and $30 to $45 million to control ash
disposal. (Fishbein 1997) Nationwide, such costs far exceed the $5.5 million RBRC price tag.
2.5.4. Business and public agency (BPA) collection system
Businesses, government agencies, and other institutions are prohibited from disposing NiCd
batteries in their municipal waste stream because BPA's do not qualify for RCRA household
waste exemptions. While enforcing this ban is difficult, RBRC hopes to reduce the incentive
for illegal disposal. Businesses and agencies pay for shipping costs to one of the three
collection locations and RBRC covers all other costs.
Without Chaige Up to Rxyle!, businesses and agencies pay for disposal and treatment costs.
Battery Solutions, Inc. priced collection, sorting, and transportation of small cells at $0.85
per pound and large industrial size at $1.10. (Battery Solutions Inc. 2000) Presumably,
BPA's are going to participate in Charge Up to Royle! if the program is cheaper to use than
traditional networks of private waste handlers.
2.5.6. Licensee collection system
The licensee fee system is meant to provide an incentive for companies to develop their own
take back channels through reverse distribution programs. Companies collect batteries and
ship them to INMETCO, whereby RBRC pays all other drum disposal and recycling fees.
The benefit to a licensee is that they get a 75% rebate on their license fee, or somewhere
around $0.1746. (Fishbein 1997) In other words, the more a company can solve the
problem by itself, the less it pays into this industry-wide take back effort.
2.5.7. Other Take Back Mechanisms
Two variations from RBRC's plan contribute to total NiCd recycling. Some electronics
manufacturers, such as Compaq, offer to send their customers packages that transport a
battery to INMETCO. Compaq then pays a fee of $0.40 per pound directly to INMETCO
for each battery recycled. Compaq will send packages to ship all battery types because they
feel that recycling only NiCd batteries neglects legitimate environmental concerns about
other battery types. (Fishbein 1997) For example, NiMH batteries contain a significant
amount of nickel, which has very serious carcinogenic properties in its airborne form.
INMETCO also sends out mailers to large industrial battery users and collects them for
$19.95 per container. A special bulk rate is available for $17.95. (Simon 1996)
2.6. Government Policy
Fifteen countries across the world and nine U.S. states have landfill bans on nickel cadmium
battery disposal. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court (City of Chicago v. Envirrnmtal Defense
Fund) ruled that incinerated municipal waste ash containing high heavy metal concentrations
is hazardous waste. Household battery discards, once exempt from regulation, now opened
up the liability floodgates since batteries are considered the major source of landfill heavy
metals. PRBA formed RBRC later that year.
Most major U.S. laws have some influence on nickel cadmium battery regulation, such as the
Clean Water Act overseeing leachate from landfills. CERCLA (Superfund) contains
provisions for both cadmium and nickel contamination, and the Clean Air Act Title III lists
cadmium emissions as a hazardous air pollutant subject to very strict MACT standards. The
most important legal mechanisms for the purpose of this thesis are the Universal Waste Rule
(part of RCRA) and the Rechargeable Battery Management Act, although both were
motivated by a plethora of state regulations on battery disposal.
2.6.1. Universal Waste Rule - A modification of RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is one of the most important regulatory tools
for tracking and controlling the fate of hazardous materials. A key concept in RCRA is the
Manifest System of tracking hazardous waste from generator to storage to transporter to
final treatment and disposal. This comprehensive tracking is often called the "cradle to
grave" system because someone is always responsible for the material and there is paperwork
to trace any missing links back to responsible parties.
One important exemption to many RCRA rules, for very practical reasons, was household
generated waste. Government policy makers realized that enforcement and monitoring of
individual household waste would be impossible without an intrusion of privacy. Even so,
some states imposed landfill bans on nickel cadmium batteries. These bans were political
statements that states were serious about getting nickel and cadmium out of the waste
stream.
BPA's are subject to RCRA regulation depending on how much waste they generate. RCRA
classifies generators into three categories: very small, small, and large; each with more
stringent requirements. One of the problems with respect to battery recycling is that
transportation is only feasible when a large quantity has been accumulated. This would make
any retailer or collection storage facility subject to more stringent regulation.
The 1995 Universal Waste Rule gave an exemption to collectors of battery waste provided
that collection was intended for transportation and ultimate recycling purposes. (United
States Environmental Protection Agency 1997) This gave much more flexibility to RBRC in
setting up and operating the extensive network of collection points necessary for economical
battery transportation to INMETCO. For example, RBRC pointed out that shipping one
pound of batteries from Iowa to Pennsylvania cost $1.00 before the Universal Waste Rule,
but only cost $0.17 after its implementation. (Fishbein 1997) Savings came from reduced
manifest document generation, less liability, ability to use non-hazardous waste transporters,
and saved time. As the PRBA president explained, "We have been handcuffed and shackled
by certain federal and state regulations. If we go through the regulatory route, it will take
several years [to approve recycling]." (Lee 1996)
2.6.2. The Rechargeable Battery Management Act of 1996
While the Universal Waste Rule modified RCRA requirements, it could not preempt state
sovereignty. Therefore, states were not forced to revise their regulations or implement a
system for enforcing new federal rules. While the federal government always has the ability
to withhold highway funds for non-implementation, such practices add to an already strained
state-federal relationship. States often don't have the resources to quickly implement federal
rules. By 1996, only 36 states had updated their own policies to incorporate the Universal
Waste Rule.
Later in 1996, Congress passed the Rechargeable Battery Management Act to make the
Universal Waste Rule applicable to all fifty states (§ 104). The Act's general tone was
focused heavily on assisting industry efforts to self-organize a recycling program. Public
education and participation were cited as "key" to program success. (United States
Environmental Protection Agency 1997) EPA was required to consult battery
manufacturers and ensure general implementation of recycling efforts. The Battery
Management Act was clearly written with PRBA and RBRC in mind.
Title I § 103 of the Battery Management Act required that manufacturers put labels on the
outside of NiCd batteries, instructing consumers on proper disposal. The mandated
uniform labeling scheme was supposed to homogenize diverse state requirements and raise
consumer awareness. The US EPA approved RBRC's label in 1998. In addition, the Act set
product specifications that ensured easy removal of batteries from electronic devices.
Violation of either labeling or making batteries easily removable resulted in penalties and
enforcement actions by the US EPA. (United States Environmental Protection Agency
1997)
Republicans gained landslide victories in the 1994 election, creating a majority over
Democrats in both the House and Senate. It was clear that the political agenda had made a
decisive shift. Republicans favored a more laissezfaire approach to environmental protection,
giving companies the freedom to implement industry environmental initiatives. Rep. Scott
Klug (R-Wisconsin) and Rep. Frank Pallone (D-New Jersey) co-sponsored the Rechargeable
Battery Management Act, but most support came from Republican House members. Many
Democrats in Congress were not enthusiastic supporters of the Battery Management Act. In
addition, the US EPA was cautious in its support for the Act because it feared that the new
law would reduce care by which batteries are handled.
Response by other constituencies was not very supportive. George Dreckmann, recycling
coordinator for Madison, Wisconsin, thought that "if we were to list environmental
priorities, this wouldn't even be in the top 20," he said. "This isn't a tough bill, it's a no-
brainer, and I don't think it accomplishes anything as far as where the industry is headed."
He voiced skepticism about logistical implementation of RBRC's plan. "Studies show that
consumers will participate (in recycling programs) only if it's convenient," Dreckmann said.
"They will only go to a place [RBRC participating retailer] if they already had another reason
to go there in the first place." (Falsani 1996)
2.6.3. European regulation
Europe, in general, has been much less open to the idea of long-term cadmium use. Sweden
banned the use of cadmium in some products in 1980's. The EU also drafted proposals to
ban cadmium batteries by 2008, with the strongest support from Germany. The
Netherlands has also been a strong advocate of recycling batteries. They mandated a law
that requires a 90% recycle rate, but to date they have only achieved a 60% rate. France
recently enacted legislation requiring that all battery manufacturers have a plan for recycling
their batteries by 2001, with a recycling rate of 65% by 2003. The distribution system being
developed there is similar to RBRC's plan. (Haznews 1999) Belgium has one of the most
stringent battery management plans, imposing a $0.33 tax on batteries that are not being
recycled at 75% by 2000. (Fishbein 1997) It seems that Belgium is the only country with a
clear sanctioning system for failure to reach desired recycling rates.
Germany recently incorporated nickel cadmium batteries into the DSD (Duales System
Deutschland). Starting October 1998, DSD would coordinate take back through its "green
dot" logo license system, which operates similar to RBRC on a large scale (incorporating
many household consumer products and packaging).
2.7. Policy Conclusions for Nickel Cadmium Recycling
The quote from Rep. Scott Klug suggests that the political climate supported less direct
government intervention to handle the nickel cadmium battery problem. However, the facts
of this case do not imply that an industry-led initiative is fulfilling the public need for less
NiCd discards. This is not to imply that modifying RCRA was imprudent.' Rather, the
Universal Waste Rule redraft was a tacit commitment by the battery industry that less
regulatory oversight would be rewarded with higher recycling. Keeping the context in mind,
we may comment briefly on several aspects of the public policy behind this case.
First, government enacted the Battery Management Act without assuring sufficient
observability and enforcement. The Act was lauded as a win-win scenario, where
5 Mostpeople involved with environmental management note the recycling disincentives written into RCRA.
government got a recycling system implemented and industry was assured that nickel
cadmium batteries would not be banned. Basic contract law suggests three conditions must
exist for a stable agreement: (1) specificity, (2) observability, and (3) enforceability. The
Battery Management Act was fairly specific in mandating that RCRA exemptions were
granted only under condition of recycling system implementation. It was even more specific
about requirements for the label to be placed on batteries. However, there were no
conditions put on either EPA to actively observe or monitor recycling rates. Most
importantly, the Battery Management Act provided few enforcement options for the
government. Battery manufacturers were subject to some legal requirements regarding the
label, but absolutely none regarding recycle rates.
Other countries have added accountability measures to take back legislation, as mentioned in
section 2.6.3. Unfortunately, there are no readily available data on recycling rates over the
last five to ten years in these countries, making policy evaluation very difficult. Thus, it is
hard to definitively state that more enforcement would solve the recycling system's low
recycling rates. Policy options to increase recycle rates are explored further at the end of this
thesis. However, the lack of visible recycling success under enforceable conditions suggests
that more ingrained problems exist. Analysis of the nickel cadmium recycling system and
potential ingrained problems is presented in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 3 - ALUMINUM INTENSIVE VEHICLE
The automobile is often lauded as the world's most recycled consumer product. However, ,
automobile manufacturers, metal producers, and recyclers have become concerned about the
ability of current end-of-life markets to handle increased aluminum and non-metallic (plastic)
content.
The automobile industry consumes almost 20% of the total aluminum market, making it an
important customer. Since automobiles are heavily recycled, they constitute an even more
important fraction of the secondary recycled aluminum market. Therefore, changes in the
automobile industry have the potential to strongly affect secondary aluminum markets as a
whole.
The case will look at the end-of-life market for automobiles and aluminum in particular.
The move to an aluminum intensive vehicle is essentially a perturbation of this complicated,
interdependent system. Drawing on several analytical studies, the case will discuss how this
system might respond to future aluminum material substitution. This research is the basis
for examining the implications for industrial ecology of metals in terms of recycling choice -
open loop or closed loop - and maximizing material value from system behavior.
3.1. The Aluminum Intensive Vehicle Basics
3.1.1. Characteristics of the AIV
While there is no scientific definition, an automobile is considered "aluminum intensive" if it
contains roughly more than 700 pounds of aluminum. Several AIV's are already in
production: Audi A8, Honda Acura NSX, and the Plymouth Prowler. (Ng, Miller and
Tessieri 1999) The choice to use 700 pounds as a defining characteristic of AIV's is
somewhat arbitrary because the aluminum content has been steadily increasing in automobile
material choice. Pressures from environmental regulation of pollution and emissions, as well
as petroleum use conservation in general, is driving this material choice. Table 3.1. la. lists
the material breakdown for a standard (non-AIV) automobile.
Table 3.1.1a. - A Typical Composition of a
2000 U.S. Automobile (non-AIV) [Ward's, 1999 #80]
Material Weight (b) Weight (%) % Changefrom 1988
Plastics 412 13.5 42.7
Aluminum 340 11.1 56.2
Copper 45 1.5 -8.9
Zinc 16 0.5 -21.9
Other Ferrous 67 2.2 32.8
Iron 430 14.1 -6.3
Carbon Steel 965 31.6 -49.2
HS Steel 247 8.1 6.1
Stainless Steel 42 1.4 26.2
Glass 86 2.8 1.2
Rubber 133 4.4 -0.8
Fluid 177 5.8 -0.6
Other 96 3.1 -29.7
Total 1 3050 100 (rounded) -3.8
Figure 3.1.1., from Ducker Research Company, shows how aluminum content has been
steadily increasing. Even though aluminum accounts for only 11% of current automobile
mass, this percentage has increased an average 4.2% per year from 1977 until 1999.
(Aluminum Association 2000)
Figure 3.1.1a. Average Al Content per U.S. Vehicle (Aluminum Association 2000)
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Table 3.1.1b. should give the reader a feel for where growth areas exist in specific
automotive aluminum applications. The body sheet is obviously a major change for
automobiles (increasing from essentially zero lb./vehicle to 500 lb./vehicle). This is one
reason that wrought automotive aluminum parts will be in higher demand, increasing
significantly more than cast parts.
Table 3.1.1b. Aluminum Usage in AIV's (Ng, Miller and Tessieri 1999)
Component Group Pounds per Pounds per AIV in Change
Vehicle in 1996 2001 (projected) (%) 
Powertrain 138 241.3 75
Body sheet, hang-ons, and 4.5 492.4 10842
bumpers
Structural groups, brakes, 49.6 192.1 287
wheels, and electrical group
Heat exchangers, climate 49.3 41 -17
control units
Interior, safety components 7.1 22.5 217
and miscellaneous
Subtotal of all cast parts 189 347.3 84
Subtotal of all wrought parts 59.5 642.0 979
Subtotals classified by:
Cast parts 189 347.3 84
Rolled parts 30.6 478.0 1462
Extruded parts 25.5 97.5 282
Forged parts 3.4 66.5 19
Total 1 248.5 989.3 298
Moving to AIV production will require many changes in current automobile manufacturing.
For the last century, automakers have been trained to work with steel, which has different
metalworking properties from aluminum. Everything from stamping to welding will have to
change. While aluminum metalworking technology is well established, it will require capital
investments beyond those normally involved in launching a new car line. The inherently
higher value of aluminum might lead to more specialized auto parts pre-fabrication and may
require less assembly costs (possibly offsetting increased capital costs). Increased part value
has spin-off effects on consumers as well. Car collisions will be more expensive to repair,
and insurance costs may increase.
3.1.2. Market Position
Aluminum intensive vehicles are mostly experimental at this point with only a handful of
models made worldwide (in relatively small sales). However, many industry experts
anticipate dramatic changes in aluminum automobile content over the next thirty years. The
Partnership for New Generation Vehicles (PNGV) is a consortium working on introducing a
high volume AIV-type sedan into the US market. PNGV might catalyze material shifts in
other vehicle types (compact size, light trucks, etc.). Researchers at Oak Ridge Laboratory
propose the following market penetration schedule. (Das, Curlee and Schexnayder 1997)
Table 3.1.2. Projected U.S. PNGV Sales and Market Share
(Das, Curlee and Schexnayder 1997)
High Case Low Case
Vehicle Sales Vehicle Sales
Year (thousands) Market (thousands) Market
Autos Light Share (%) Autos Light Share (%)Trucks Trucks
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010 97 75 1.0 0 0 0
2015 904 709 9.0 169 133 1.7
2020 3144 2275 29.0 517 374 4.8
2025 6146 4087 52.5 1496 995 12.8
2030 7880 4318 60.0 3939 2159 30.0
The different market demand cases are a function of two main variables, government
regulation and customer demand. Government standards could be increased and necessitate
material substitution. This assumption must be tempered by considering possible
technology advances in engine efficiency.
The other market driver could be customer demand from fuel economy and general
environmental concerns. The University of Michigan ranked these preferences in their
Delphi report series, with environmental considerations and fuel economy coming in 10 'h
and 1 1h place respectively out of 12 categories. (Chen 1994) Clearly, consumer demand will
not be the major driver in materials substitution (unless gas prices increase significantly or
pollution magnifies). The willingness to pay is just not high enough.
3.2. Material Flows of Aluminum
3.2.1. Aluminum Production
Primary aluminum is made from an energy intensive "Hall Heroult" process, whereby
alumina is electrolyzed by carbon anodes. The Hall Heroult process consumes well over 13
kWh per kilo aluminum. Technological progress has significantly improved this energy
efficiency over the last few decades. Anodes are consumed by reacting with oxygen atoms in
alumina (Al2O3), giving off CO2 among other gases. Molten aluminum is then ready for
fabrication into either extruded, rolled, or cast forms.
Large countries dominate world production of aluminum (see Table 3.2.1a.), with
disproportionately large production from countries with access to cheap power (such as
Norway's vast hydroelectric network). Production facilities tend to be privately owned in the
developed nations. However, either state owned entities or multinational corporations
constitute large producers in developing countries. The United States is similar to other
countries in that a few large companies dominate production (see Table 3.2.1b.). Pending
anti-trust investigation, Alcoa will control well over half of the primary aluminum
production with the Alumax and Reynolds acquisitions.
Table 3.2.1a. - 1998 World Smelter Production (United States Geological Survey 1999)
1998 Production Percent of Percent Production per GDP
(thousand Total Change from (tons/million $)
metric tons 1997
Australia 1,580 7.12 5.06 4.338
Brazil 1,200 5.41 0.00 1.598
Canada 2,340 10.54 0.43 3.908
China 2,200 9.91 9.09 2.290
France 0,420 1.89 7.14 0.293
Norway 0,950 4.28 3.26 6.511
Russia 2,960 13.33 1.69 10.701
South Africa 0,660 2.97 0.00 4.948
Venezuela 0,600 2.67 -6.67 6.316
United States 3,700 16.67 2.70 0.451
Other 5,550 25.00 4.68 N/A
countnes
World Total 22,200 100.00 3.60 0.7725
of U.S. Aluminum Producers (Plunkert 1998)
Company 1998 Yearend Capacity' Percent of Total
(thousand metric tons)
Alcan Aluminum Co. 186 4.42
ALCOA (pre-1998) 1,290 30.64
Alumax Inc.' 651 15.55
Reynolds Metals Inc.8  448 10.64
Century Aluminum Co. 168 3.39
Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. 168 3.39
Goldendale Aluminum Co. 168 3.39
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. 273 6.48
NSA 186 4.42
Noranda Aluminum Co. 215 5.11
Northwest Aluminum Corp. 82 1.95
Ormet Corp. 256 6.08
Vanalco Inc. 116 2.76
Total 4,210 100.00
Figure 3.2.1. Aluminum Market Concentration
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6Yearend capacity had not changed from 1996.
7Alumax Inc. merged with Alcoa in 1998.
8 ALCOA and Reynolds have both agreed to a merger. ALCOA will acquire Reynolds stock, but retain
consumer brand products under the Reynolds name. The merger is pending government anti-trust approval.
Table 3.2.1lb - Market Concentration
Aluminum recycling is an important part of the total flow of aluminum through economies
around the world. For example, the United States depends on secondary production for
approximately one third of its total supply (with the other thirds coming from domestic
production and imports). The importance of recycling is underscored by the fact that scrap
can be recovered into useful form for about 5-10% (about 0.65 kWh) of the energy required
for primary production.
3.2.2. Aluminum Use
Aluminum has several characteristics that make it a very useful material. Most importantly, it
is one third less dense than steel with a specific weight of 2.7 g/cm3 . It tends to be less
susceptible to corrosion than iron or some forms of steel because aluminum forms an oxide
on its surface. Aluminum oxides do not flake or separate from the metal in the same way
iron rust may. Aluminum is also a good conductor of electricity, reflects both heat and light,
is nonflammable, and has desirable ductility. Sheets thin as 0.007 mm are impermeable and
opaque to light. (Hydro Aluminum 1992) As with many metals, alloys can change important
characteristics.
One of the most visible applications to consumers is the aluminum beverage can. The
Universal Beverage Can has captured essentially the entire beverage can market. Plastic
bottles compete with beverage cans, but each has comparative advantages; e.g., the can is
easier to chill, while the plastic bottle can be resealed. The aluminum can contains over half
recycled material and was specially designed to be closed loop recyclable; i.e., the material
can be directly melted back into usable can alloys.
Aluminum has many substitutes because of its wide range of applications. In fact, its growth
has occurred through replacement of other materials instead of applications to new
products. Its very usefulness and broad applicability makes it susceptible to substitution
unless pricing remains competitive. Copper can easily substitute aluminum in transmission
wires, although it is much more expensive under current conditions. Steel and titanium can
technically replace aluminum in transportation applications. High performance military
aircraft use titanium because it blends aluminum's lightness with steel's strength. Aluminum
has replaced wood in a few construction applications, and competes closely in some
products (such as stud materials or residential house siding).
Table 3.2.2. U.S. Aluminum Shipments by Industry (thousand tons) (Plunkert 1998)
1996 1997 1998
Industry Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % % change
from 1996
Containers and 2,180 22.6 2,220 21.7 2,270 21.6 4.13
Packaging
Building and 1,330 13.8 1,320 12.9 1,390 13.2 4.32
Construction
Transportation 2,640 27.5 2,990 29.2 3,250 30.8 18.77
(Cars & Light (1,908) (18.2)
Trucks)
Electrical 671 7.0 708 6.9 714 6.8 6.02
Consumer 655 6.8 694 6.8 725 6.9 9.66
Durables
Machinery 596 5.9 626 6.1 629 6.0 5.25
Other 291 3.0 318 3.1 286 2.7 -1.75
Total Domestic 8,330 86.6 8,880 86.8 9,270 88.0 10.14
Exports 1,290 13.4 1,360 13.2 1,260 12.0 -2.38
Grand Total 9,610 1 100 10,200 100 [10,500 1100 8.48
The applications listed in Table 3.2.2. and other data from the USGS are used to construct a
material flow Sankey diagram (see Figure 3.2.2.). (United States Geological Survey 1999)
The numbers are approximated to accommodate data discrepancies because much of this
data is difficult to measure. Two important aspects must be emphasized. First, most
aluminum recycling happens within industrial facilities during the manufacturing of
products, accounting for the "new scrap." Second, "old scrap" (including returned
discarded products) is made up of primarily recycled beverage can aluminum and automotive
aluminum. In general, aluminum recycling accounts for a significant portion of the total
material flow, making it an essential facet to the overall economic landscape of aluminum
supply and demand issues.
9 Adjustments based on the Ducker report, that 1999 passenger and light truck markets will consumer 3.815
billion pounds of aluminum.
Figure 3.2.2. Aluminum Sankey Diagram (metric tons)
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Growth potential for automotive aluminum is of major interest to the aluminum industry.
Given market share projections in Section 3.1.2., Oak Ridge researchers calculated expected
supply and demand deviations from the base case where automobile companies use material
composition close to current day specifications. The base case is also weighted for a 0.6%
annual fuel economy (CAFE) improvement, which translates into a 0.2% weight reduction.
The high numbers correspond to high projected growth and likewise for the low projected
market share. (Das, Curlee and Schexnayder 1997)
Table 3.2.2. Material Requirements for Aluminum-based PNGV (thousand tons)
(Das, Curlee and Schexnayder 1997)
Material 2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Demand
Increase
Cast 0 to 3 0 to 34 57to 162 to 434 to 1021to
Aluminum 303 981 1784 2043
Wrought 0 to 3 0 to 34 59 to 479 to 1160 to
Aluminum 317 1967 2321
Demand
Reduction
Carbon 0 to 8 0 to 75 122 to 338 to 875 to 1977 to
Steel 655 2052 3596 3955
High 0 to 2 0 to 18 30 to 82 to 212 to 479 to
Strength 159 497 871 958
Steel
Cast Iron 0 to 2 0 to 17 28to 77 to 200 to 452 to
1 _150 470 823 905
Data in 3.2.1. show approximate aluminum production at about 4,000 thousand metric tons.
By 2030, AIV manufacturing will require 50 to 100% more aluminum production capacity
than is currently available from domestic sources. While U.S. aluminum fabricators may
expand to accommodate some of this demand increase, it is highly unlikely that the industry
will be able to expand and meet all AIV production needs. The ability to meet projected
wrought demand increase, in particular, will be difficult to meet from domestic producers.
3.2.3. Aluminum Recycling
Secondary aluminum is often broken down into two different types: old and new scrap (see
Figure 3.2.2.). New scrap is pieces of aluminum left over from various stages of aluminum
production (casting, extrusion, or rolling) and product manufacturing. New scrap accounts
for almost 4 billion of the 7 billion pounds of recovered aluminum. Old scrap (post-
consumer materials) like the beverage can accounts for the other 3 billion pounds. (Plunkert
1998) However, old scrap has represented the largest growth area in aluminum recycling,
aided by curbside pickup and other consumer take back programs.
Generally speaking, the aluminum recycling market can be split into three different
segments: (Aluminum Association 1998)
e Large aluminum producers and manufacturers of wrought products, such as
aluminum siding.
" Producers of secondary-specification alloy ingot.
* Toll processors, who recycle secondary metal for specific producers under
contract; i.e., their product does not enter the market.
Recyclers vary greatly in size from 5,000 to 1 million tons capacity. These three types of
processors perform some of five basic functions: (Aluminum Association 1998)
* Used Beverage Container (UBC) Processing - cans are recycled back into can
sheet. This is a closed loop process. The beverage can is the most ubiquitous
form of recycled consumer aluminum, with over 66 billion cans recycled each
year - a $990 million market in total. This market alone constitutes 1,938 million
pounds of the United States' secondary aluminum, which gives the can a
recycling rate of 60%. (Aluminum Association 2000)
* Specific Alloy Production - scrap from various sources are combined to make a
specific alloy, usually demanded by a particular customer or product line. For
example, many casting products demand very specific alloys to fulfill their
intended function. The automotive industry consumes between 65 and 70% of
specific alloy production.
* Remelt Secondary Ingot - a mixture of scrap made without specific attention to
chemical composition. Large aluminum producers commonly use RSI.
" Deoxidation Ingot Production - aluminum recovered to create a feedstock for
steel making processes.
" Dross Processing - aluminum with a high level of impurities that is treated to
recover a more pure form.
Automotive aluminum recycling is considered to be an important growth area. Between 80
to 90% of the aluminum currently in cars is recycled. 60 to 70% of the aluminum in cars is
from secondary material. While aluminum is only 5 to 10% of the average automobile (by
weight), it accounts for 35 to 50% of the hulk body's value. (Aluminum Association 2000)
One of the persistent problems facing automobile recycling alloys incompatibility. Wrought
aluminum alloys contain 0.15 to 0.40 wt-% Fe and 0.10 to 1.2 wt-% Si; whereas the cast
aluminum coming from shredders contain Fe > 0.6% and Si > 7.0%. (Ng, Miller and
Tessieri 1999) The difference in composition is too great for shredder aluminum output to
be "closed loop" recycled back into automobile applications. As aluminum moves into
specialty markets, recycling will become more complex, and demand the evolution of niche
recyclers to satisfy customer needs.
Processing specific alloys requires capital investment in function-specific technology, making
this industry more risky. If customer product make-up changes, then recyclers may find it
difficult to recover capital costs. As a result, aluminum processors are going through a
period of consolidation because diversified processors may change operations and minimize
risk.
Presence of impurities is another major issue affecting overall economic feasibility of
aluminum recycling. Impurities include other metals (iron, copper, etc.), glass, combustible
materials, etc. Metallic impurities change the overall value of final secondary aluminum
products since additives may create undesirable characteristics. Magnesium is one impurity
of particular importance because it requires special "fluxing" techniques to remove. Non-
metallic impurities also raise environmental control costs, since processors have to invest in
pollution control equipment to abate emissions given off by impurities.
3.2.4. Aluminum Pricing
The cost of aluminum varies greatly between countries. A per-pound cost breakdown for
U.S.-produced aluminum (not including capital costs) is approximately: $0.175 for alumina,
$0.145 for electricity, $0.082 for labor, and $0.148 for other costs (replacing anodes, etc.).
(Das, Curlee and Schexnayder 1997) Current aluminum price ranges between $0.60 and
$0.80 per pound, which is somewhat low compared to historical levels. The Soviet Union
dissolution is the major cause for oversupply and price depression, with the recent Asian
economic crisis adding to demand reduction. Figure 3.2.4. shows aluminum prices for the
last 20 years.
Figure 3.2.4. Aluminum Prices (United States Geological Survey 1999)
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Alumninumn production, as with many other metal fabrication processes , is an
environmentally intensive industry. Figure 3.3.1. gives a schematic representation of
alurminum's energy lifecycle. (Roy F. Weston Inc. 1998) Each lifecycle energy consumption
stage is reported in megajoules per 1000-kg product (bauxite, alurmina, etc.), rather than per
1000-kg final product. This is done because there are four different products and efficiency,
represented by the Product Ratio Factor (PRF), may vary depending on waste recovery
processes in each facility. The PRF is a function of chemical reaction dynamics within the
lifecycle stage, and can be mathematically represented by the ratio of input to 1-kg output;
iLe., it takes 2.64-kg bauxite to make 1.0-kg alumnina.
Figure 3.3.1. Lifecycle Stages of Aluminum Production
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Carbon dioxide is increasingly becoming a pollutant of major concern to the aluminum
industry. The two main sources of CO2 are from anode reduction and associated energy
expenditures. Reduction is the process by which carbon anodes remove oxygen atoms from
alumina, producing about 1.5 kg CO2 per kg molten aluminum. Most CO, comes from the
associated energy costs, such as energy input to reduction process and transportation. These
combine for about 12 kg CO2 per kg aluminum, however this number may vary greatly
depending on the energy source for reduction (hydroelectric or fossil). The aluminum
industry is closely watching progress in climate change negotiations and the possibility of a
carbon tax. Perfluoro carbon compounds are another set of potent greenhouse gases
emitted from the smelting process. Other smelting emissions include flourides of several
varieties (which can chemically "scorch" plants near facilities), sulfur dioxide, and polycyclic
organic matter (tars).
Electricity
Production
Bauxite
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Another significant environmental concern related to aluminum production is hazardous
solid waste. Alumina refining produces large quantities of iron oxide containing sludge,
called "red mud." Red mud also contains caustic soda, which can be removed in more
advanced refinery systems. Over one third of bauxite input ends up as red mud. A solid
waste produced from smelting is spent potliners. Potliners are containers used for the
electrolytic process. Dross waste is a product of salts and molten aluminum. Salts bind to
impurities and rise to the top of molten aluminum, whereby "dross" is skimmed off the top.
This substance is toxic if it comes in contact with water.
3.3.3. Energy and Resource Conservation
Energy consumption is usually noted as the major environmental concern of aluminum
production. Aluminum recycling is economically favorable mostly due to the fact that
primary aluminum is energy intensive. It takes seven to ten times more energy to produce
primary aluminum compared to secondary aluminum (depending on the kind of aluminum
and recovery processes). Steel also enjoys significant energy savings since it takes two to
three times more energy to make primary steel.
Resource concerns about aluminum are not generally directed towards scarcity of bauxite (or
alumina), since it is a very abundant material on the earth's crust. Conservation of aluminum
through recycling is more of an effort to capture energy savings from avoiding primary
production. However, if we consider landfill space as a limited resource, then aluminum use
is a resource conservation issue. Landfill space conservation is a major issue in European
countries.
3.4. Industry Structures
3.4.1. Automobile industry
The automobile industry is one of the most important economic sectors in most
industrialized countries' economies. This thesis looks primarily at the end-of-life recycling
market for automobiles; but as mentioned before, this industry is best viewed as an
interwoven cycle of activity. Section 3.4.1. will describe the important influences automobile
suppliers, manufacturers, and dealers have on the industrial ecology of metals.
Automobile manufacturers are the most important factor in determining how cars move
through end-of-life markets. This happens primarily through product design choice - in
terms of material choice, physical material shape, durability, and how pieces are connected or
located in the automobile. The suppliers are important insofar as their ability to meet
product specification demands from automobile manufacturers at a low cost. Suppliers are
not usually the target of regulation or external pressure to increase recyclability in the same
ways as the auto manufacturers. However, supplier technology is a crucial factor in defining
the economic capability of different design goals; e.g., light-weighting, reduced drag, etc.
The automobile dealer acts as a broker in this industry, contributing in many important ways.
They are crucial in adding liquidity. Liquidity is needed to reduce inventory costs and
enhance sales flexibility to high value production units. The dealer's liquidity demands a
premium and recovered through markups charged per car. Their relationship to recycling is
mostly through control of new automobile supply. Dealers also use marketing schemes to
develop or take advantage of consumer preferences (including fuel economy). They are also
subject to recycling legislation if deposit systems are mandated because the sticker price will
be higher.
3.4.2. Automotive recycling industry operations
The recycling industry is a $3.4 billion operation, employing over 40,000 people at 7,000
individual business establishments. (Das and Cruise 1999) Arguably, these numbers do not
represent the full impact on society since automobile recycling benefits car manufacturers by
stabilizing material price. In addition, recyclers provide a great service by ridding our
landscape of the once daunting junked car landfill problem. About 95% of all automobiles
are recovered for recycling (totaling 10 to 11 million junked vehicles per year), which is a
vast improvement from the 1960's.1o
There are three main actors in the recycling system: dismantlers, shredders, and non-ferrous
separators. While some recycling operations combine various parts of the three functions,
10 It should be noted that while 95% of cars are recovered, about 20 to 25% of vehicle mass is lost in each
recovered car. Most of this lost mass is known as automotive shredder residue (ASR).
they are considered separate for the purposes of material and economic analysis. Table
3.4.2. lists material recovery by function.
Table 3.4.2. Material Recovery Rate by Operation Type
(based on current steel-intensive automobile) (Das and Cruise 1999)
Material Type Weight Material Recovery (% weight)
(lb.) Dismantling Shredding Non-ferrous Separation
Carbon Steel 1526 35 64 1
High Strength Steel 369 35 64 1
Cast Iron 350 90 9 1
Cast Aluminum 178 15 20 65
Wrought Aluminum 178 15 20 65
Plastics 342 0 90 10
Magnesium 5 0 20 80
Copper 45 20 0 80
Zinc 15 0 0 100
Other materials 358 50 50 0
Total weight 3240 35% 55% 10%
Dismantlers are often the same businesses that pick up old cars from the last user. On
average, the dismantler offers between $50 and $300 for an incapacitated automobile, but
this amount may vary by the condition or quality of the car. Two kinds of parts are
removed. Primary parts have either inherent material value or must be removed for
regulatory reasons; e.g., the lead battery. Secondary parts have same-use value after
reconditioning; e.g., radio. Secondary parts add inventory costs to the dismantler since the
market for used parts is hard to determine. After removing parts from the car, a dismantler
will crush the body into a "hulk," saving space in transport to a shredder. The hulk is sold
to a shredder.
Well over 10,000 dismantlers process 11 million cars per year in the United States, and over
half are family-owned. (Das and Cruise 1999) Each individual business is usually small with
10 or fewer employees. (Chen 1994) Dismantlers are extremely important first players in the
downstream system because they ultimately determine the ferrous and non-ferrous content
of hulks. For example, dismantlers eagerly take off aluminum hubcaps, but take value away
from the non-ferrous separator.
Shredders slice the hulk into fist-sized pieces and retrieve most ferrous material. Shredders
can process an entire hulk in 45 seconds. A hammer mill is the major capital cost for
operators, and requires extensive maintenance (6 to 8 hours per 10 to 12 hour woikday).
Non-metallic material, called automotive shredder residue (ASR), is usually sent to the
landfill for final disposal. Ferrous material is separated by magnets and sent to electric arc
furnaces or other steel industry businesses. Automobiles account for 80% of shredders
input material, with the other 20% coming from "white goods."
Non-ferrous material is sent to a separation process, which uses density-separating
techniques to sort materials into different bins (for aluminum, zinc, copper, etc.). Less than
a dozen stand-alone non-ferrous separators exist in the United States, despite the fact that
capital costs are low. (Das and Cruise 1999) In general, non-ferrous separators are not as
profitable as the other businesses in recycling. While aluminum separation is of primary
concern for this thesis, it is unlikely that non-ferrous separation would be viable if it did not
also separate other valuable metals.
3.4.3. Automotive Recycling Industry System Relationships
The automotive recycling industry is strongly driven by metal markets and the auto
manufacturing industry. Broadly speaking, the recycling industry provides two essential
services: 1) raw material price and supply stabilization, and 2) spent vehicle handling/landfill
space conservation.
Merely landfilling old cars would produce a national waste problem given the millions of cars
produced every year. In fact, the United States and other countries faced such a dilemma in
the 1960's. The US Bureau of Mines published a 1967 report, entitled "Automobile
Disposal: A National Problem," which addressed the rapid buildup of junked cars and their
increasing visibility across the national landscape. The problem was rooted in technology
choice of steel makers. The basic oxygen furnace (BOF), a common technology choice
during the 1960's, limited acceptable levels of input impurities. Scraped vehicles had too
many other metals for the hulk value to exceed handling costs. Junk yards were able to
recover the engine block and other high value parts, but the rest was left to rust and create
an unsightly symbol of industrialism-gone-awry.
Although legislative proposals gained serious momentum, this dilemma was solved primarily
by the new electric arc furnace (EAF) technology. The EAF could handle much higher
impurity levels and had much smaller capital costs. These mini-mills benefited from lower
barriers-to-entry in the scrap processing market, allowing geographic, capital budgeting, and
other limitations to decrease in importance. The other technological development that
helped solve the automobile disposal problem was the "shredder." Auto shredders are
mechanical systems for chopping hulks into fist-sized pieces of metal and allowed for easier
magnetic separation of non-ferrous and ferrous materials.
The other function of recycling is stabilization of price and supply, most evident during
World War II. The surge of industrial activity during WWII led to metal shortages, including
both steel and aluminum. Recycling efforts alleviated some of the supply shortages and
helped keep prices down. While recent recycling has taken on an environmental persona, it
undeniably aids in assuring reliable supply. As the aluminum Sankey diagram shows,
automotive recycling is a significant portion of the total metal flow.
The economic lifecycle diagram (see Figure 3.4.3.) shows that the recycling system is very
complicated. This diagram is a template for economic transactions between different
businesses in the system. "System value" denotes internal costs or operations that do not
take place in the market. These costs are a function of technology choice or supply chain
management in the case of acquiring cost. The internal costs and technology choice
employed by each actor help define system value because they are determining factors of
how materials flow through the system. On the other hand, "transactions" refers to market
transactions where clearing prices are established on not influenced by any one given firm.
Transactions define the distribution of costs and benefits across actors, but do not
contribute to system value.
Figure 3.4.3. condenses a lot of information about this recycling system. Transferability for
the final operator refers to the end user's knowledge about disposal options. Condition of
car, which influences system value, is also reflected in the cost to keep it running. However,
this is primarily an issue for dismantlers because car condition mostly influences used parts
value, not raw material value. The acquiring costs listed for dismantlers, shredders, and non-
ferrous separators refer to the supply chain management costs for each firm. For example,
shredders may have to spend extra money on maintaining a reliable hulk feedstock through
long term contracts.
Figure 3.4.3. Recycling System Economics
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3.5. Effect of Aluminum Substitution on Recycling
The high volume AIV sedan is a concept product right now, but recent industry trends
suggest that aluminum has already made a significant presence in automobile material choice.
CAFE and other environmental pressures may force the automobile industry to gradually
move towards AIV's without the big fanfare of PNGV. While 85-90% of automotive
aluminum (in the end-of-life market) is recovered for recycling, that still leaves 10-15% going
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into the waste stream. The next three sections describe the efforts of researchers to
understand how aluminum material substitution might change the end-of-life market.
Several open questions permeate this discussion. Will increasing automotive aluminum
content reduce recycling efficiency? Can wrought supply increase fast enough to meet new
demand? Is unsorted automotive aluminum recycling inefficient? If so, from who's
perspective, individual firms or the system as a whole?
3.5.1. Reynolds Metals Study
Researchers from Reynolds Metals Company (now Alcoa) constructed cost models to
examine the effect of increased automotive aluminum on recycling. They were primarily
concerned with the NGPV model, which has approximately 25% less aluminum than the
AIV in Table 3.1.1. (although in similar proportions). Of practical importance, the PNGV
program set a goal of 80% recyclability; that is, 80% of the automotive aluminum is clm'J loop
recycled back into a PNGV automobile.
After setting up the cost model, they analyzed 17 different scenarios varying the PNGV
composition. AIV's were also considered in the models, and tended to have higher
recyclability percentages. Six major conclusions came out of their study:
1) Separation technology of cast and wrought media is important to achieve "closed
loop" material flows.
2) Sorting technology for different wrought alloys is important to make sure the
system actualizes higher value of specific alloys. Sorting will also reduce
chlorination needed to "clean" alloys in the foundry.
3) Auto dismantlers can profitably segregate five types of aluminum scrap
(bumpers, hand-ons, engine and transmission, heat exchangers, and other media).
Further separation will require too much labor costs with current technology.
4) Although magnesium is lighter than aluminum, material substitution to reduce
magnesium increases recyclability from 67% to 79% and only sacrifices a 23-
pound increase. Magnesium is considered to be an extremely undesirable
impurity in aluminum alloys.
5) Alloy selection in product material choice is an effective way to design better
recycling systems.
6) Design for Recycling should favor alloys that have higher tolerance to mixing.
3.5.2. Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Material Systems Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has been very
active in exploring the effects of material choice. Chialin Chen wrote a Master's thesis,
exploring various scenarios with systems dynamics models. (Chen 1994) The other archival
resource was a Ph.D. dissertation written by Randolph Kirchain in 1999.
Chialin Chen uses systems dynamics to explore sensitivity of the recycling system to price
changes, industrial designs, and public policy initiatives. Sensitivity analysis forms the bulk
of his results. While this study looks primarily at material substitution of plastic and
advanced composites into automobile design, some of the lessons from plastics substitution
can be extended to aluminum substitution.
First, the automobile recycling industry has been well established as an economics-driven
system. This would contrast to paper recycling, where collection has been subsidized by
participating organizations (office collections, municipal curbside pick-up, etc.) Thus,
environmental or technology mandates should be carefully administered to recognize current
system incentives.
Second, the value-chain of automobile recycling is highly interdependent. A systems analysis
is crucial when considering policy options and policy makers should avoid targeting single
sectors for policy. Mandating "take-back" programs on the automobile producers may force
them to invest in recycling capabilities outside of their expertise, such as collection and
dismantling. Take-backs could force competition with existing businesses that already
provide recycling services, maybe putting them out of business. The recycling system would
run a risk of substituting expensive auto producer-led take-back process for efficient
dismantlers." This would increase overall recycling inefficiency and decrease value of
scraped material. In a sense, automobile producers would be forced to "cannibalize"
recycling system value from existing beneficial businesses.
1 Chen cites industry sources that suggest automobile manufacturer-led recycling would cost four times what
current recyclers accomplish.
Chen also makes several suggestions for industry policy makers. Not surprisingly, the role of
technology development is emphasized. After all, it was the EAF development that led to
modern-day recycling. Design for Recycling initiatives are suggested, such as reducing
material diversity, making pieces more dismantler-friendly, and establishing supplier and
recycler partnerships.
Randolph Kirchain worked extensively with Technical Cost Modeling of materials
substitution in automobiles. TCM is a bottom-up method of modeling sensitivity to various
scenarios and key variables. As with many other cost models, economic scenarios are run in
partial equilibrium (as opposed to general equilibrium analysis). For the purpose of his
analysis, Kirchain grouped nonferrous separation with shredding. Another very important
assumption is that the end user is not capable of capturing added material value; i.e. the final
operator receives the same payment from dismantlers for both standard steel cars and AIVs.
Kirchain's analysis showed the importance of dismantling since the first step in a recycle
process can determine material value down the remaining value chain. The Preferred
Removal Set (PRS) Routine is the dismantler's protocol used to extract valuable parts from a
junked automobile. Part value is not the sole determinant in the extraction decision, since
parts must be removed sequentially at a substantial labor cost. "Buoyancy" is the term used
to describe how attractive a part is for removal. Buoyancy equals "part value" minus
"extraction cost." (Kirchain 1999) The intuitive idea is that buoyant parts float to the top of
a dismantlers value preference. A comparison of various material scenarios is described in
Figure 3.5.2. (Kirchain 1999)
Figure 3.5.2. Profit scenarios for different material substitutions
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There are several important points to take away from these graphs. First, increased
aluminum content is a positive economic change for recyclers. Second, dismantlers are not
able to capture the bulk of increased material value in the system. Kirchain assumes that
aluminum materials substitution will occur for parts "hidden" in the car's structure; e.g.,
chassis and structural elements. In fact, the move to a 100% AIV only results in one major
dismantling change of hood removal. Therefore, even though aluminum parts demand nine
times the price of steel counterparts, dismantlers are not able to capitalize on material
substitution because of high removal costs. (Kirchain 1999) In other words, while an AIV is
more valuable from a raw materials standpoint, it has approximately the same "buoyancy."
While dismantlers do not remove extra parts, we might expect hulk value to offset major
differences. This is not the case because generally accepted business practices in the
automotive recycling industry have hulk prices set at approximately five cents per kilogram,
regardless of the automobile type or composition. (Kirchain 1999) Kirchain proposes that
the two most sensitive dismantler "variables" are vehicle composition and hulk price.
Shredders are the major beneficiaries of aluminum substitution. However, they are selling
their product to scrap metals brokers so profitability is highly sensitive to material price.
Likewise, the material composition of hulks bought from dismantlers determines the value
of their final scrap product. Another material issue not discussed in great detail here is the
non-metal (ASR) content and corresponding landfill prices to dispose of this waste stream.
Both variables turn out to be very sensitive shredder factors.
Hulk price is a sensitive variable for shredders (as it is with dismantlers). Shredders lose $10
profit for every penny per kg price increase. Therefore, hulk price adjustments may be one
way of distributing profit windfalls between dismantlers and shredders. The likelihood of
dismantlers increasing hulk price to enjoy profits depends on many economic characteristics
of the recycling system.
One caveat of Kirchain's dissertation is to remember that aluminum substitution was not
engineered with Design for Recycling in mind. Automobile manufacturers may choose to
make their cars more "buoyant" by designing easily dismantled parts. Dismantlers would
most likely respond by taking more pieces out of the automobile and lower the hulk price
and weight. While dismantlers may enjoy higher profits, the shredder could be in danger of
losing input material. Moreover, shredder profitability falls dramatically below 70% capital
utilization rate. (Kirchain 1999)
This possibility was explored by TCM scenarios of dismantling times, with the idea that less
dismantling times correspond to an automobile designed for recycling. Surprisingly, the
TCM showed that dismantlers still do not remove a majority of the junked car mass at zero
disassembly time. (Kirchain 1999) While this analysis is an approximation of buoyancy tests
on AIVs (without DfR in mind), it definitely challenges standard assumptions about
dismantler barriers to removal. Buoyancy must be a more complicated concept than merely
time required to take a part out.
The AIV with an aluminum engine block presents an interesting scenario. In this case,
shredders can improve profitability of the aluminum engine-AIV scenario by offering a
higher hulk price (eighteen cents per kg), which would give dismantlers an incentive to
remove less material (including the engine). In fact, both dismantler and shredder profit
would increase. Again, Kirchain's TCM challenge standard assumptions about system
optimization. This result essentially says that both firms are better off with less part removal
and dismantling, which runs against the rhetoric of increased dismantling as a solution to
recycling. Dismantlers may be less efficient in processing material, giving shredders the
comparative advantage.
The recycling system seems to buckle when an AIV uses aluminum for its chassis and engine
block. Given a moderate degree of "buoyancy," the shredder can not pay the dismantler
enough to not disassemble. This scenario would force serious changes in the shredding
industry.
3.5.3. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Study
Oak Ridge Laboratory has been quite active in analyzing many transportation issues -
recycling AIV's notwithstanding. Sujit Das, T. Randall Curlee, and Susan Schexnayder
published a study entitled, "Materials Used in New Generation Vehicles: Supplies, Shifts,
and Supporting Infrastructure." (Das, Curlee and Schexnayder 1997)
Base case profitability was estimated for the dismantler, shredder, and non-ferrous separator
to be 30%, 64%, and 14% respectively. Although "profitability" was not precisely defined, it
should suffice for the comparative purposes of this thesis. Figure 3.5.3a. presents the
following cost structure for the automobile recycling industry:
Figure 3.5.3a. Cost Structure of Automobile Recycling Industry (Das and Cruise 1999)
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This cost structure suggests a few things about the recycling system. As the authors note,
capital costs are low for each business as a fraction of the whole. Presumably, these
numbers represent return of capital costs since the other costs are variable. The authors
conclude that infrastructure changes will not have as large of an effect as material
composition. However, it is premature to make definitive statements due to capital
budgeting uncertainty. For example, return on capital costs may be low per unit, but that
may occur in a situation where capital equipment is both expensive and long-lived; e.g., high
barriers to entry.
Even so, the author's emphasis on material costs seems well placed. Each business' material
costs are inversely proportional to their overall profitability. This seems reasonable when we
see that the service provided by recyclers is to add-value to material. Processing material
into more useful forms or composition enhances value-added capacity and puts the non-
ferrous separator at a profit disadvantage. Aluminum recovery is not a high value-added
activity.
The scenario above describes the automotive recycling system base case where steel
intensive automobiles are recovered. Moving to an AIV could be good for non-ferrous
separators if they can develop value-added competencies; e.g., casting and wrought
separation. However, it could be bad if aluminum parts are easy to dismantle since the non-
ferrous separator volume would decrease. By simplifying issues of alloy compatibility, Das
and Curlee compared ferrous substitution rates to profitability (see Figure 3.5.3b.).
It is immediately apparent from Figure 3.5.3b. that shredders are capturing most of the
profit from having a more valuable metal flowing through the recycling system. Authors
credited this to lower hulk weight and increased aluminum revenues from scrap sold to non-
ferrous separators. Unfortunately, there was no further detailed discussion of this issue.
Figure 3.5.3b. Profitability vs. Ferrous Substitution (Das and Cruise 1999)
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Das and Curlee performed various sensitivity analyses with a conservative estimate of an
AIV (50% more aluminum than the base case). Two major conclusions were derived from
the sensitivity analyses. First, if dismantlers want to take more aluminum out of cars, then
they must remove between 35 and 5 0% of the car's total aluminum in order to retain base
level profitability (30%). This is because higher investment and labor costs needed to extract
aluminum parts follow increasing returns to scale. The second main conclusion is that non-
ferrous separators approximately double their profitability under the 50% increased
aluminum-content automobile scenario. Furthermore, their profits can substantially increase
if they can separate the higher valued wrought alloys away from castings.
In summary, Das and Curlee believed that increased aluminum content would have a
universally positive effect on every automobile recycling firm. However, they noted that
system value maximization might not be obtained unless coordinated effort is undertaken to
increase alloy separation. Nonferrous separators are seen as more effective processors in
this respect, but may be hindered by pre-emptive dismantler sorting. The authors also point
out that one dozen non-ferrous separators are not capable of handling the AIV, and that
major infrastructure investment is needed on the short-term horizon.
3.6. Government Policy
3.6.1. CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) Standard
CAFE standards were introduced in response to long lines at gas stations during the 1970's
oil shock. The U.S. public pressured government officials to make automakers adhere to a
minimum miles per gallon standard. The thinking was that car companies needed to be
accountable somehow, so car fleets manufactured during times of oil abundance would not
be a major problem if another oil shock occurred.
Even with the historical practice of light-weighting automobiles to meet CAFE standards, it
is entirely possibly that automakers may use alternative technologies. For example, hybrid
automobiles are one technology solution to meeting CAFE. However, for the purpose of
this thesis, it is assumed that automakers will lightweight to an AIV.
Figure 3.6.1. CAFE Standards (US Department of Transportation -- National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration 1998)
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3.6.2. Clean Air Act
Clean Air Act regulation promulgated under Subchapter II (Emission Standards for Moving
Sources) also affects material choice for automakers. Standards are usually specified in terms
of end-of-pipe pollution levels (grams) per mile. Sometimes, the auto industry was required
to install new technology to meet the desired goals. The best example of such pollution
control on automobiles is the catalytic converter. Weight reduction and aerodynamic
designs are both ways to reduce grams/mile emissions because of gas mileage increase. A
10% decrease in drag leads to a 2% increase in fuel efficiency. (Chen 1994)
Both Clean Air Act and CAFE standards are tunable regulations, in that government
agencies may adjust numerical requirements without new statutory legislation. Agency
discretion is used to determine the appropriate levels, and they are given the authority to
"tighten the belt" on performance. This tunable feature is one reason why CAFE standards
are a high priority on the list of engineers, since the initial automobile design period may be a
few years away from production. By the time a car is actually produced in large numbers,
standards may have changed.
3.6.3. Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicle (PNGV)
One of the major government initiatives affecting automobile end-of-life markets is the
PNGV, which is a collaborative effort between the three major U.S. automakers (Ford,
Daimler-Chrysler, and General Motors). The goal is to develop an 80 miles-per-gallon
family sedan without sacrificing important consumer preferences, such as safety,
performance, and comfort. The program's goal is to have a protocol automobile ready for
production by 2005.
It is widely expected that the 80-mpg goal will be met in part by substituting materials,
specifically aluminum or composites for steel. By introducing these new materials, car
companies hope to cut the current average weight of 3200 lbs. to about 2000 lbs. PNGV is
one of the most influential industry policy initiatives with respect to material substitution.
One of the implicit goals is to help the automotive industry advance fuel efficiency and light-
weighting without losing competitive advantage. The mechanisms for accomplishing this
goal are collective technology development, standardized solutions to industry-wide
problems (such as recycling), and normalizing time to market with new product.
3.6.4. Department of Energy "Industries of the Future"
The U.S. Department of Energy entered into an agreement with members of the aluminum
industry through a program called, "Industries of the Future." This program is an effort to
develop key technologies seen as critical to enhancing energy efficiency of emerging
aluminum markets. The aluminum program specified five goals: scrap separation, alloy
preservation and optimization, design for recycling, furnace technology, and automotive
initiatives. (Aluminum Association 1998)
While the last goal has immediate implications to this thesis, the other four goals are just as
important. Scrap separation has been one of the key barriers to increased recycling because
process technologies often include high labor costs. Taking advantage of low-cost labor
locations (such as Mexico) is often not feasible because of transportation costs. Scrap
separation has an immediate impact on all downstream processes because sorting ultimately
determines scrap-input quality to secondary processing. Aluminum presents unique
separation difficulties because of alloy compatibility issues and the small density
differentiation between alloys.
"Design for Recycling" (DfR) is one of many manufacturing practices, collectively know as
"Design for X."12 The purpose in any design program is to intentionally emphasize a certain
product characteristic. In this case, the desirable characteristic is recyclability. Recyclability
is a vague guide to design and often demands coordination between competitors and
suppliers to ensure total industry participation. This is because automobiles designed for
recycling are goods with network externalities; i.e., one DfR car among 1000 non-DfR cars is
not worth as much as one DfR car among 1000 DfR cars. Automobile dismantling is
routinized according to specific protocols to minimize processing time. Dismantlers need to
be able to follow one (of a limited few) routines.
12 Other design programs include design for environment, safety, quality, etc.
The Aluminum Association specified several Design for Recycling characteristics: 1)
consistency in alloy use for product parts, 2) identifying parts by alloy, and 3) designing for
ease in separating parts that include or attach to other non-aluminum materials. (Aluminum
Association 1998) These technological demands are intended to make recycling easier for
dismantlers and reduce the alloy contamination introduced during automated non-ferrous
separation processes. One possible idea includes "total car dismantling," where large-scale
facilities will take apart most (if not all) of the automobile, replacing the role of 12,000 small-
scale "junk yards."
3.6.5. European Recycling Initiatives
In general, European recycling drivers arise from higher landfill costs and resistance to waste
transportation. Sweden initiated a deposit system in response to a protectionist measure,
prohibiting the export of domestic steel. The ban on exports lowered steel value and made
automotive recycling less profitable. This led to disposal problems similar to the U.S. in the
1960's. Germany passed a law that required car owners to obtain a certificate of disposal to
stop billing of annual registration and insurance fees.
3.7. Policy Conclusions for AIV Recycling
The formal policy instruments available to government agencies are quite limited. Adjusting
CAFE standards and Clean Air Act emissions limits are both effective in light-weighting the
vehicle. However, the US EPA has no ability to specify how efficiency gains or light-
weighting should be implemented. They are even further removed from an ability to control
how such standards could affect the recycling system. Broader policy options affecting
supply and demand relationships or prices seem like the only government solution. These
options are discussed further in Chapter 5.
Thus, the Department of Energy and EPA initiate industry partnership programs; e.g.,
PNGV and "Industries of the Future." Several characteristics of these programs limit their
ability to be successful. Partnerships are voluntary agreements between industry and
government, making enforcement very difficult. The incentive to uphold one's commitment
depends on the value of remaining a member of the group. Partnerships act like "clubs"
because membership offers some value. In the case of PNGV, the automakers derive good
will benefits from trying to create socially beneficial product choices. Research collaboration
and harmonizing time-to-market reduces the risk posed by trying to create a new product.
Leaving the club runs the risk of allowing competitors to potentially capitalize on a new
market segment.
Government holds the key to allow partnerships with reduced anti-trust concern, but retains
limited ability to enforce agreements and goals. Thus, industry will not be sanctioned by
failure to reach the goals of an 80% recyclable - 80 miles-per-gallon automobile. Actually,
the government may lose credibility when trying to initiate successful future partnerships.
This inadvertent sanction on government for industry failure may be a disincentive for
government officials to advocate socially optimal options. Instead, they may search for
moderate options with higher likelihood of industry implementation.
Therefore, it is highly uncertain that either Clean Air Act or partnership policy options are
going to be successful in guaranteeing an AIV efficient recycling system. A new approach
may be necessary. Chapter 5 will continue this policy discussion by proposing alternative
options.
CHAPTER 4 - ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
This chapter presents an analysis of recycling systems in the nickel cadmium battery and
aluminum intensive vehicle cases. Analysis is directed towards identifying strong and weak
points in the end-of-life markets, qualitative characterization of metal intensive product
recycling systems, and future areas of research. Econometric analysis is intended to add
descriptive depth to the case studies. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of
the two cases, with specific attention on comparing the public policy differences.
4.1. Econometric Analysis
One tool for concisely picturing the recycle system as a whole is by plotting the actors out
on a matrix, where each square represents the interaction between two members.
Traditionally, econometricians use this sort of relationship scheme to begin involved
quantitative analysis. For the purpose of this thesis, the matrix will be a talking point for
descriptive analysis. Thus, while interactions focus on transactions such as sales and
purchasing, "softer" economic costs and benefits are also included; e.g., customer
satisfaction. Internal transactions are featured along the diagonal, such as processing
technology utilization, administration, material value actualization (asset accumulation)."
The next two figures are econometric matrices for the nickel cadmium and aluminum
intensive vehicle recycling systems. The two major constraints are that (1) the sum of each
row must be greater than zero (individual profit motive), and (2) the sum of the diagonal
must be greater than zero (system profit motive).
Several features stand out immediately, such as the symmetric axis along the matrix diagonal.
The most notable difference between the two figures is that the AIV matrix has a simpler
1 Material value actualization is a form of asset accumulation in the context of an end-of-life economic system.
Material flows from the end user in a one way direction, thus metal must reach a final point before it becomes
an input for a process not related to the end-of-life (product manufacturing).
value chain structure, whereas the NiCd matrix has disproportionately more transactions
with two actors (RBRC and INMETCO). This feature is indicative of a subsidized system,
where centralized planning is necessary to coordinate collective action. The next few
sections continue from this simple initial analysis.
Figure 4. Ia. - Nickel Cadmium Battery Econometric Matrix
A B C D E F G H I J K
A -- Retailer (as seller) P +
B - Last User - OC + +
C -- Retailer (as collector) + P +
D - Municipal/BPA Collector P +
E -- RBRC - - - P -+
F -- IMETCO + P + + + -
G -- Cadmium Scrap Market - P +
H -- Ni-Fe Scrap Market - P +
I -- Stainless Steel Industry - V
J -- Battery Manufacturers V -
K -- Landfill/Waste Market + + + P
Figure 4. 1b. Aluminum Intensive Vehicle Econometric Matrix
A -- Last User
B -- Dismantler
C -- Shredder
D -- Non-ferrous Separator
E -- Used Parts Market
F -- Ferrous Scrap Market
G -- Non-ferrous Scrap Market
H -- Steel Industry
I -- Aluminum Industry
J -- Automobile Industry
K -- Landfill
Icm gLEGEND CONSTRAINTS
+ Income generating transaction "Individual profit motive"
- Purchasing transaction Sum of row > 0
P Process resources spent to extract valuable product or "System profit motive"
administer operation Sum of diagonal > 0
V Material Value Actualization - Asset Accumulation
OC Opportunity Cost (cost of opportunities forgone)
4.2. NiCd Recycling System Analysis
While the matrix in section 4.1. gives a concise view of the recycling systems, it offers little
resolution of the actual details. Drawing information from the case study, we can more
accurately describe the system in Figure 4.2 (see Appendix 1). The next few subsections
highlight strong and weak points in the RBRC-led take back system.
4.2.1. Strong Industry Participation
Industry cooperation is strong with over 80% of all NiCd batteries bearing the RBRC seal.
In addition, over 20,000 retail chains have signed up for the program across Canada and the
United States. This was achieved only four years after initial implementation of the program.
While industry participation is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient by itself for creating
a successful recycling system.
First, achieving a stable and predictable material stream is important to turn dead batteries
into profit. Capacity utilization, as in many industrial processes, is key in having an adequate
return on capital for INMETCO. Second, RBRC would not have public policy legitimacy if
there was low industry participation. Congress passed the Battery Management Act with the
intention of aiding an industry-wide national NiCd collection program. Public concern
leading to the threat of action against cadmium could easily resurface if it was perceived that
RBRC was not delivering on its promise of an industry-wide take back.
4.2.2. RBRC's Role as a Trade Association
The decision for battery manufacture to participate may not be obvious from the matrix
because the constraint on their row is that the horizontal sum be greater than zero. This
implies that the battery manufactures would have to actualize enough material value from
recycling to offset the other costs (logo license fees, mailers, etc.). The case study tells a very
different story, which is why the trade association benefit makes up for the balance. Despite
RBRC's lack of publicly stated purpose to assuage regulators, battery manufacturers joined
the program to preempt restrictive legislation on their products. Thus, RBRC acts like a
trade association in preserving the business interests of its members. This service has
positive economic value by maintaining business as usual practice with product manufacture
and sales activities.
The incentive for retailers to participate as collectors is a prominent feature of this matrix.
Retailers are mostly concerned about preventing deposits or product bans. An added bonus
occurs with the interaction between the retailer (as collector) and the end user. It is a "win-
win" scenario for both parties. The end user's need to recycle (as an environmentally aware
citizen) is satisfied, and the retailer benefits by having increased store traffic and building
positive rapport with potential customers. (RBRC 1999) The "win-win" situation seems to
look like a positive externality in the recycling system because the price of the battery does
not appear to reflect the real surplus enjoyed by both parties. A positive externality
contributes to retailer and consumer participation, but is not desirable from the standpoint
of battery manufacturers' interest in minimizing logo fees.
4.2.3. Weak Consumer Participation
End consumers have little incentive to do anything other than throw their batteries into the
garbage. RBRC counts on the same consumer goodwill exercised in recycling of newspaper,
plastics, and glass to motivate nickel cadmium product return. This section focuses on the
opportunity cost matrix cell for the end user.
Japan, the single largest producing country of NiCd batteries, has had a concerted recycling
program for many years. One would expect to find a high awareness in Japan compared to
other places. However, NiCd batteries elude mainstream awareness in Japan as in many
other countries. The Nikkei English News published a 2000 person countrywide survey
performed in late 1996 - only 50% of the respondents knew of NiCd batteries, 36.9% knew
that the batteries are recyclable, and only 24 .5 % kept the used batteries (to recycle). (Nikkei
English News 1996)
The United States, arguably the largest consumer of NiCd batteries, has an even worse
awareness of recycling rechargeable batteries. RBRC sponsored an NPD Group survey to
assess consumer knowledge with over 1200 sample households. The key findings were that
while 95% of the households own cordless devices, only 16% recycle their batteries, and
they prefer recycling and environmentally friendly activities that are easily done at home.
(Business Wire 1999) 16% contrasts greatly to a 75% participation rate in bottle, can, and
newspaper recycling. The most common profile of a NiCd recycler is a married, middle-
aged professional, with a college education and no children.
"What this survey points to is the great need for public education," said Ralph Millard,
executive vice president, RBRC. "Our goal is to encourage portable product owners - which
is 95% of the population - to learn more about their products and the power behind them.
Recycling NiCd batteries is easy - just call 1-800-8- BATTERY or go online at www.rbrc.org
- but getting people to take that first step is the real challenge." (Business Wire 1999)
Awareness may be explained by the infomation cost to learn about nickel cadmium batteries.
One of the problematic characteristics of information costs is that consumers may not even
be aware of the real cost to learn about recycling. All it takes is the perception of costly
learning to prevent the consumer from taking the time to actually learn, which may actually
be less than the perceived hassle. Thus, real costs also include an irnanien cost. In
addition, if the education information does not convey the marginal benefit to consumers
from taking batteries back, then a voluntary recycling plan will have little hope of success.
RBRC is limited in explaining the marginal benefit because it may make consumers backlash
even more against nickel cadmium products.
Although RBRC is considering expansion of the take back to NiMH, they strategically chose
to exclusively focus on NiCd battery recycling to limit program cost and coverage - there
was little public concern for other rechargeables. But an exclusive recycling focus can hurt
consumer understanding because they must be able to differentiate and select NiCd batteries
out from all other sorts of batteries. Many consumers do not understand the extent of
environmental risk posed by various technologies, so only emphasizing one type may
confuse the public. Consumer psychology tends to focus on a product's service, not the
product itself; suggesting that a broad battery take back may be more effective.
4.2.4. Macroeconomic Risk Exposure for INMETCO
INMETCO advanced recycling technology from cadmium removal and disposal (waste
treatment) to true cadmium recovery. The technology is environmentally beneficial because
cadmium can be re-used, rather than shipped off for disposal. However beneficial,
INMETCO is only able to create a marginally profitable product. Low profit margins are
very undesirable when coupled with INMETCO's high operating macroeconomic risk.
First, NiCd consumption accounts for over 75% of the total cadmium material flow, and
production levels heavily influence prices (see the Cadmium Sankey in Chapter 2).
INMETCO has little influence over primary cadmium production. This puts them at a
disadvantage in controlling global supply and price levels. Second, recycling operations
increase supply, which can contribute to price depression if cadmium demand growth is not
sufficient. Third, cadmium is also a natural by-product of zinc production. As long as zinc
demand is sufficient, there will be a consistent stream of cadmium available to the market.
Finally, zinc (and cadmium) fabrication is subject to overproduction in developing countries
and economies in transition that are looking for hard currency from battery manufacturing
countries (Japan and U.S.).
4.2.5. Free Riders
A recent report by Raymond Communications, "Battery Recovery Laws Worldwide," stated
that not all the RBRC participants pay their share of the $7.5 million collection and recycling
price tag. (Raymond Communications 1999) Potential for free riders arise anytime an
organization (firm, group of firms, or government) provides a public good. Public goods
have two characteristics - they are non-rival and non-exclusive. Non-rival goods have zero
marginal cost to provide the service to one additional consumer. Non-exclusive goods are
services where the producer can not exclude people from consuming it. Obvious examples
of public goods are national defense and street lighting.
The RBRC program, in theory, is not a public good because it is exclusive - they charge a
fee to license their logo, which then allows the battery to be recycled. However, in practice,
the program operates more like a public good than one would originally think. This is
because RBRC's legitimacy derives from its ability to have a broad scope. If RBRC does not
attempt to recycle almost all nickel cadmium batteries, then the battery industry runs a risk
of government intervention. Therefore, RBRC is reluctant to impose sanctions on members
that do not pay license fees, making the recycling service less exclusive.
While the marginal cost to recycle one more battery is not theoretically zero, variable costs
are arguably far less than the fixed costs to establish and maintain a national recycling
organization. Another way to think of this program's non-rival character is that once the
bins and collection points are created, adding one extra battery costs almost nothing.
Likewise, once the trucks are shipping batteries to INMETCO, adding an additional battery
is negligible.
Aside from non-paying members, RBRC could be subject to other forms of free ridership.
For example, retailers may take back batteries without the RBRC seal, fearing a lost sale
from turning away a conscientious consumer. Consumers who tend to recycle batteries have
higher-than-average disposable income, and are very valuable customers. A retailer who
refuses to accept a battery may look unconcerned with the environment. A recent RBRC
poll of participating retailers corroborates these general concerns. RBRC was gauging the
acceptability of expanding Chage Up to Rcycle!to other battery types, and asked retailers what
reasons they have for providing these recycling services. The top four reasons (allowing for
multiple responses) were: (RBRC 1999)
(1) Provide Customer Service - 58%
(2) Increase Store Traffic - 55%
(3) Comply with Law - 21%
(4) Already Collecting and Need Program - 14%
4.3. Recycle rates are low
The previous sections describe important features of RBRC's take back program. Most of
these features raised serious concerns about the system's ability to function successfully as a
program for recycling 70% of small sealed batteries. The concerns are corroborated with
current available information, such as recycle rates and projected goals. The goal set by
RBRC is a 70% recycle rate, and has been an elusive target as Table 4.3. suggests. 1999
seemed to tell a similar story as 1998, in that the recycle rate continues to hover around 30%
and goals for reaching 70% are at least 5 years away.
Table 4.3. Readjusting Goals: RBRC's timeframe for a 70% recycle rate of small cells
Date of Commitment Target Year Source
1995 1998 (Hachman 1995)
1996 2001 (Goodwin 1996)
1997 2002 (Mooney 1997)
1998 2004 (RBRC 1998)
The European counterpart to PRBA is the European Portable Battery Association (EPBA),
and has made similar arguments for industry self-governance over cadmium bans or battery
deposits. However, their goals seem to be more modest, saying that a 7 5 % collection rate is
"preposterous." (Haznews 1998) As a result of the PDB study, RBRC has admitted the lack
of consumer awareness and participation. (NMarket 1999) The battery industry seems to be
forming consensus that voluntary take-back schemes will not produce short-term recycling
rates of 70%. It is unclear, however, that the industry believes regulation can achieve such
rates instead. The means to reach a 70% rate are in serious question.
Japan has been trying to increase recycling of nickel cadmium batteries for many years. One
study cited in Lankey, shows an erratic recycling rate from 1980 to 1990, ranging between
15% and 30%. More data collected from 1991 to 1994 shows roughly the same. (Lankey
1998) Of the batteries being recycled, over 70% were collected through OEM reverse
channel routes, and another 20% though waste collectors (non-municipal waste services).
As with the US and Europe, Japan has had much more success recycling the large vented
industrial NiCd batteries, but has yet to establish a reliable program for reclaiming small
sealed cells.
Although consumer battery recycle rates are low, industrial batteries have been relatively
more easy to recycle. The difference between industrial and consumer recycle rates batteries
highlights the comments made about opportunity costs. Industrial batteries are used by
businesses and public agencies, which have a strong legal incentive to not dispose of the
batteries. They are regulated as hazardous waste, and must be disposed of according to strict
RCRA regulations.
4.4. Aluminum Intensive Vehicle Recycling System Analysis
Once again, the matrix using symbols may not provide resolution we desire in analyzing the
recycling system. Figure 4.4. (see Appendix 2) provides a descriptive look at the interactions
within this system. The following subsections will give focus on specific and important
aspects of this matrix.
4.4.1. Strong End User Participation
The end user's decision decides the fate of any product in an end-of-life market - either it
gets recycled or thrown away. In the case of automobiles, end users have been faithful
suppliers to junk yard dismantlers for over 20 years. As the case study discussed,
technological breakthroughs (EAF and shredder) enabled the system to turn handsome
profits from used cars. This allows dismantlers to offer $50 or more for old cars, which has
been ample compensation for end users to have their "jalopies" hauled away.
Another way of looking at this situation is to consider the end users decision as weighting of
the $50 against opportunities forgone by getting the car repaired (for more than $50) and
extending its life. The aluminum intensive vehicle would alter this tradeoff because
dismantlers are willing to pay more for aluminum cars. In general, we would probably see
automobiles enter the recycling system sooner. Higher transfer price between dismantler
and end user would also assure a continued automobile recycling rate of 90 to 95%, possibly
even increasing it.
4.4.2. Lost Aluminum Value in Future AIV
As the case study mentioned, combined wrought (sheets and extrusions) and casting material
streams can only be recycled into casting material; i.e., the more valuable wrought material
value is lost into casting. Recovering alloy-sensitive wrought products separate from castings
would maximize value from this system. One of the limiting factors in alloy separation is
that the difference between densities is too small for current automated non-ferrous
technology. Thus, labor intensive dismantling seems to be the most obvious choice for alloy
separation.
Getting the incentives aligned to encourage specific dismantler behavior is not easy,
especially considering the decentralized junkyard industry structure. The next chapter will
discuss policy options for achieving this goal. At this point, it is interesting to note that
value actualization (on the econometric matrix) happens in the used scrap market, steel
industry, and automobile industry. In particular, automobile manufacturers are the last point
of aluminum material flow. This implies that the value of increased aluminum material can
be captured by carmakers. Moreover, the value is dependent on the extent of value-added
activities performed by recyclers and transfer prices. Automobile manufacturers should be
thinking seriously about how to recover this infusion of aluminum material value by
influencing recycler behavior and product design.
4.4.2. Dismantler/Separator Instability
As the case study discusses, infusion of aluminum (at current AIV estimates) into the
recycling system is a positive economic change - profitability of all recycling operations
increases. Problems arise from the fact that most material value is in aluminum parts -
processing costs make steel marginally profitable compared to aluminum. As more
aluminum is substituted into the car, a point is reached at which the dismantler finds it
profitable to take out a lot of aluminum. So much that the shredder must actually pay the
dismantler to keep it in; otherwise the shredder can not recover costs from steel alone.
Shredders are more efficient than the dismantler at removing aluminum from parts buried
deep in the car. Thus, total dismantling will result in less profit for both the dismantler and
shredder compared to a situation where the shredder pays a dismantler to keep it in.
Another critical point is reached when aluminum is substituted in for the engine block,
chassis, and body. At this point, the shredder can not pay the dismantler enough to not
remove parts. The recycling system collapses to pure dismantling. Implications beyond this
are unclear, but possible options include junked ferrous hulk accumulation, landfilling of a
significant fraction of the automobile, and shredder subsidization (operating as waste
processors). The problem is summarized as a failure in individual profit motive to create
system value maximization.
4.4.3. Conflicting environmental goals
Experts in the automobile industry are familiar with the dilemma posed to them. On the
one hand, government wants more fuel-efficient cars, demanding more advanced materials
substitution. On the other hand, government tries to encourage efficient recycling, which is
difficult to achieve because of changing inputs and diversity of economic actors in the
recycling system. The two competing goals are not necessarily at odds in all instances, but
must be reconciled and carefully considered.
In general, this problem points to an aspect of industrial ecology of metals. By limiting
analysis to the behavior of metals in products, we have not given the related effects an equal
place at the table. While industrial ecology acknowledges that resource efficiency is good
because of related environmental savings, it does not necessarily provide a framework for
making informed tradeoffs. For example, it may be more environmentally beneficial to
reduce recyclability by a certain per cent if another aspect (such as fuel efficiency) is
improved. In life cycle analysis, this problem corresponds to boundary selection - how
expansive should we analyze the impacts of a certain product or process?
4.5. Comparative Analysis
It is readily apparent that the two cases offer very different stories of how metal intensive
products are recycled. Comparison of the two cases offers insights on recycling system
behavior and public policy response to the need for effective recycling. First, the
opportunity cost for end users is much different; that is, the cost of not being able to do
something other than returning the product. Alternatives to recycling drive the decision of
end users and are the critical first step in the system. In addition, available opportunities are
a function of many variables (possibly too expansive to list here). An unfortunate
implication of heterogeneous and complicated opportunity costs is that general studies of
recycling systems are also very complicated.
Second, the cases share in their limited available policy options to address recycling system
efficiency. After the Battery Management Act was enacted, the US EPA had little recourse
in the event of low recycling rates. This problem is even more poignant in the AIV case.
Short of major statutory reform, agencies are limited to partnerships for addressing the
efficiency of an AIV recycling system. Both cases draw out a well-documented problem in
administrative government - agencies enabling legislation often prevents or disallows them
from addressing their public goals.
Third, current policies used in both case studies have little accountability. As mentioned in
the NiCd case, industry was given significant regulatory relief without being subject to
accountability measures. Short-term problems associated with effective policy
implementation have already been discussed, but attention should also be given to long term
problems. If Charge Up To Recyde! does not perform as promised within the next five to ten
years, then industry's failure to provide this public good will surely be exposed. This result
could undermine the public's trust in various ways. The public would not trust government
to negotiate its power and capabilities with industry, even though private sector solutions
and implementation can be more efficient in many cases. Also, the public would not trust
industry to uphold its promises, perpetuating modern perceptions that corporate interests
are alienated from social interests. These scenarios are not in the interest of government
officials, industry leaders, or the public.
Fourth, industry conditions for the two cases are much different and support differentiated
policy options for recycling metal-intensive products. As mentioned in section 4.2., the
macroeconomic price risk has made cadmium recycling essentially unprofitable for
INMETCO. Had prices remained over five dollars per pound, then incentives to recycle
could open up industry led options to increase recycling rates; e.g., offering rebates for
returned batteries. The AIV case is extremely complicated with respect to managing
industry structure. The implications include uncertain technology development and
increased difficulty in setting standards.
CHAPTER 5 - POLICY OPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The final chapter develops a list of policy options for improving the nickel cadmium battery
and AIV recycling systems. The econometric matrix is a useful tool for presenting a wide
scope of information with the caveat that choosing a policy option requires much more
detailed analysis of costs and benefits.
Generally, we can group policy options into three categories: "push" and "pull" public
policy, and industry policy (see Chapter 1). The first chapter described frameworks and
motivations behind different policies. The next three sections are based on matrices
developed in Chapter 4. The last sections discuss merits of different policy options, and
generalize their relevance to various types of recycling systems.
5.1. "Push" Policy
Push policies are aimed at increasing the supply of available recyclate material by modifying
consumer behavior. Increasing supply will either make recyclate material cost effective
where before it was not competitive with virgin material, or control the fate of materials in
the end-of-life market to alter biological impact pathway. In general, push policy options
include compulsory take back, fixed target recycling, landfill bans, municipal collection,
production quotas, and deposits.
While some of these policies seem very similar, they are aimed at changing different types of
behavior within the system. Compulsory take back forces producers to accept their products
once a consumer is finished. By itself, a take back does not force recycling. Rather, it
imposes a cost on the manufacturers by making them develop channels for retrieving
products. RBRC is a good example of how costs have been centralized by many
manufacturers, but one could imagine each individual firm also developing their own
program of contractors and transportation services. In both cases, the cost ultimately is
taken out of profits and/or imposed on the consumer through higher prices.
Coupling take back with a landfill ban may encourage consumers to utilize the industry take
back channel. On the matrix, a landfill ban will change the opportunity cost of the last user.
It will make the alternative to recycling more costly because some sort of penalty might be
assessed. Thus, end users are more likely to send products into the recycling system. It is
unclear how effective landfill bans are from the nickel cadmium battery case. Some states
ban NiCd disposal while others do not. However, no state-by-state recycling rate difference
is noted. One possible explanation is that banning NiCds is an unenforceable policy, thus
failing to alter end user opportunity cost.
Fixed target recycling is another way to put teeth into a take back policy. As mentioned in
the NiCd case, certain European countries have imposed fixed recycling rates with possible
sanctions (tax per battery) in the case of non-compliance. While recycling rates were higher
in these countries than in the United States, it is difficult to assess the degree to which fixed
recycling rates changed behavior. Three general problems arise in this case. First,
monitoring recycle rates is difficult. Second, picking the wrong tax level could burden
consumers or encourage partial compliance (by paying the tax instead of recycling). Third,
fixed recycling rates do not change the opportunity cost of end users, failing to address the
weakest point in the NiCd recycling system.
Municipal collection programs have been relatively successful in recovering materials that
have little or no value; e.g., glass and paper. In fact, aluminum cans often subsidize the
whole program. While many cities have "hazardous waste day" collection, municipal
programs for NiCd batteries have been far less successful. One possible reason is that
batteries must be treated with more care than glass, plastic, and paper, making weekly
curbside collection impossible. Citizens must drive to a collection site approximately once
per month, making recycling more inconvenient. Mandating stronger municipal collection
policies seems unrealistic and expensive.
Deposits are used to increase the price of a product, whereby the deposit is paid back after
the product is returned for recycling. Deposits are a strong motivation for end users to
return products because the opportunity cost to not recycle is visibly higher. A financial
mechanism with clear payoffs may be more effective than a landfill ban where relatively
small sanctions (order of $100) are almost never enforced.
The AIV case does not seem appropriate for take back or deposit policies since return rates
are about 95%, and material recycling after return is over 75%. Although recycling steel
intensive cars has been a historical concern (especially in Europe), aluminum is in no danger
of being thrown away.
5.2. "Pull" Policy
Pull policy options increase consumer demand for recyclate material. Increased demand for
recyclate creates a competitive market need, hopefully improving the technology and
efficiency of collection and recycling. Pull policy options include minimum recycled content
specifications, procurement policy, taxes on virgin material, and price supports for products
containing recycled material.
The Partnership for New Generation of Vehicles, mentioned in the case study, has set a goal
of 80% closed loop recycling in developing a future car design. This type of specification is
a form of "pull" policy because it forces automobile manufacturers to use recyclate, thus
creating additional market demand for recycled automotive aluminum and steel. This could
potentially have dramatic implications for wrought products. Current recycling downgrades
wrought into the recycled casting quality stream. Demand for recycled aluminum wrought
could force technology changes in the dismantling and separation operation.
Procurement policy is another form of pull policy. Executive Order 12873 requires agencies to
implement "Federal Acquisition, Recycling, and Waste Prevention" pursuant to $6002 of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). EO 12873 broadly mandates procuring
agencies to prefer recovered or recycled products. The United States government is the single
largest customer of many goods and could exercise significant consumer pressure for
automobiles with high-recycled material content for car fleets in the Park Service, Post Office,
etc. Other large customers, such as car rental companies, could use similar pressure as part of a
product differentiation strategy. One limiting factor is that automobiles are not usually
differentiated across environmental characteristics, let alone recycled content.
Taxes on virgin material are technically price adjustments. However, they affect demand by
effectively increasing competitive advantage of aluminum made from recycled material. In
addition, tax revenue could be targeted at recycling technology and infrastructure
development, reducing the need for long term government intervention. In the case of an
excise tax (where aluminum producers are taxed per unit sold), the aluminum industry would
place pressure on the scrap market to deliver more recyclate material. They might pay a
price premium for recyclate scrap so long as the premium is less than the tax.
Taxes on virgin material may help improve the economic viability of INMETCO in the
NiCd case. Alternatively, a negative tax (subsidy) could be used to support the price of
recycled cadmium. This would help mitigate some of the macroeconomic risk exposure to
international supply and overproduction problems.
5.3. Industry Policy
Industry policy is based on coordinated corporate policy or strategy between two or more
firms in a competitive market. Trade associations represent many industry policy interests
and have been quite active for the last century. A common industry policy taken by many
associations is lobbying government officials on behalf of members' financial interests with
the goal of influencing public policy. For example, chemical firms in the United States
initiated the Responsible Care ® program under the auspice of CMA (Chemical
Manufacturers Association). Responsible Care® is a codified environmental management
system aimed at establishing baseline performance levels so that irresponsible action taken
by one firm will not hurt the collective industry image. Other industry policy actions
suggested in this section (specific to the industrial ecology of metals) include R&D
technology development, product standard specifications, merger and acquisition, and
supply chain management.
Processing costs are decreased mostly through R&D, technology change, and efficiency
gains. Finding a non-labor intensive solution to the alloy separation problem would
dramatically change the AIV recycling system. Unlike the EAF, it seems that this particular
technology solution would result from some degree of coordinated effort. Aluminum
producers have the metallurgical know-how, auto producers have technical skills for
implementing design changes, and auto recyclers will be the eventual separators.
INMETCO has already overcome one significant technological hurdle in the NiCd case.
Enhanced NiCd recycling is more a function of consumer participation and logistical
planning. However, if RBRC incorporates NiMH and Li-ion batteries into the take back,
then sorting technology would be important.
Product standard specification may be one technical avenue for encouraging aluminum alloy
separation. The dismantler's labor and technology constraints suggest that industry-wide
coordination is needed to ensure efficient recycling operation. For example, the dismantler
does not have the capacity to learn a different part separation routine for each car model
type.
Another industry policy option is merging or acquiring competitors to gain more control
over industry behavior. Increasing the value of recycled material and parts involves policy
designed to support a healthy market for aluminum alloys and other parts. One suggestion
might be to encourage loop closing in automobile material flows, thus securing alloy supply
and demand relationships. Automobile manufacturers could invest in recycling operations
or somehow gain more influence on their activity through contracts.
One foreseeable problem with aluminum intensive cars is saturation of certain alloy markets
as a consequence of material choice and/or recycling processes. In particular, the demand
for casting quality aluminum may be exceeded by supply created from automotive recycling.
If cast alloy markets become saturated, then the overall value of the car could decrease. The
urgency for preemptive industry policy is highlighted by a 10-year lag time. That is, by the
time alloy saturation is noticed in aluminum markets, there will be at least 10 years before
immediate action can have an impact. Industry consolidation may assist in preventing
market saturation, but free trade barriers and macroeconomic risk will cap risk reduction by
import competition.
As mentioned in the AIV case study, one possible implication of maximum aluminum
substitution is recycling system collapse. If aluminum is substituted for the body, engine,
and chassis, then shredders become obsolete. Social welfare implications are clearly
undesirable because of steel hulk accumulation and landfill usage. Likewise, U.S. automakers
would desire to remain relatively free from regulation of end-of-life vehicles. It would be in
the interest of all parties for auto manufacturers to manage recycling operations as an
extension of their business.
5.4. Implications for Industrial Ecology of Metals
5.4.1. Policy Preferences
The intuitive appeal of "pull" policy is that it had fixed target and flexible means. The
additional demand creates incentives for recycling, while leaving the market to develop least
cost means in achieving the desired recycle rate. The corollary is that "push" policies suffer
from fixed means to achieve increased recycling. In addition, push policies can run the
danger of creating too much recyclate material, bottoming out the entire market and risking
system collapse; e.g., packaging materials and the DSD system in Germany. However, this
may be an unfair condemnation of push policies.
The two cases give a little more insight on the appropriateness of these two types of policy
options. Generally, we see that pull policies are more effective for recycling systems where
the last user has sufficient incentive to recycle and a functional system is in place. On the
other hand, push policies may be necessary for products where the last user does not have
sufficient incentive to deliver the expired product to the recycling system. This
generalization has several justifications. First, pull policies may not be able to catalyze the
formation of a recycling system where none existed before. In a sense, pull policies are
incremental changes from business as usual. Second, push policies operate directly on the
end user, changing their opportunity cost in the system. This is a more effective method to
initiate product return than pull policies, which must work backwards from the material
demand.
Pull policies would not have worked in starting a nickel cadmium battery take back. The
battery industry had an incentive to operationalize a recycling system in a short time span,
and the RBRC Chaige Up To Reyle! program more than doubled small cell recycling in four
years. While RBRC-led take back may not be a sufficient condition to achieve the desirable
70% recycling rate, it seems to be a necessary condition. Therefore, some combination of
push and pull may be needed to propel recycling rates to their promised levels.
The AIV case clearly shows that landfill bans or take backs are not appropriate for an
operational recycling system. The problem with aluminum substitution is a matter of trying
to maximize the material value in the system and protecting from possible system failure
(albeit a small probability). These issues require pull policy intervention such as specifying
wrought recycled content.
The case studies might imply another generalization about policy appropriateness. It seems
that push policies are more appropriate for controlling the fate of substances where there
exists a biological impact pathway concern. The motivation to control toxic material fate is
driven by public and environmental health consequences, not resource efficiency or
economic asset value maximization. Push policies are directed at pushing the supply of
material from the end user through a planned recycling system, where that planned recycling
system can be set up to handle toxic material. On the other hand, pull policies rely on
market demand and thus some sort of material value motivation.
5.4.2. Industrial Ecology Classifications
A question begged by the obvious differences between the AIV and NiCd cases is whether
the industrial ecology of metals is a useful classification when looking at end-of-life markets.
Macroeconomists have already shown the importance of macro-level material flows through
national resource balances. But should industrial ecology be parsed into material types
(plastics, forest products, etc) when considering targeted microeconomic recycling policies?
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Based on the lessons learned from this thesis, industrial ecology should not be parsed into
material categories when analyzing end-of-life markets.
For example, one of the main distinguishing differences between the NiCd and AIV systems
was the last user's opportunity cost. It may be suggested that the last user's opportunity cost
is a useful starting point for classifying different end-of-life industrial ecologies. Nickel
cadmium batteries and leaded cathode ray tubes (CRTs) have more in common than with
the AIV. Both have toxicity concerns, are not readily dematerialized, and have little inherent
material value to the last user. However, CRT landfill bans could be far more effective
because they are not easily hidden in municipal waste streams. Therefore, opportunity costs
in the two examples are very different. In terms of identifying policy opportunities, the last
user's opportunity cost is far more important than product characteristics (such as material
type) by themselves.
Another possible point of departure for classifying end-of-life systems would be to divide
material concerns into biological impact pathway control and material value maximization.
These two motivations are fundamentally different in terms of incentives, available
technologies, and policy pressures.
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of characteristics describing end-of-life systems in
these two cases. The list below suggests that many variables influence end-of-life markets.
Industrial ecology studies should be very careful not to hastily group products together
without considering such a list. The particular list developed for these case studies show that
a metal product generalization is not useful.
Technical:
. Substitutability of virgin materials
* Energy ratio (primary/secondary)
* Recovery type (functional vs. material)
* Material recycling technology
" Product complexity (beverage can vs. automobile)
Economic:
* Opportunity cost of last user - "returnability"
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* Inter-sectoral - how many industrial sectors does it cross?
" Inter-temporal - how long is product turnaround time (from manufacturing to
disposal)?
" Value Chain characteristics
- Market concentration of recycling actors
- Dependency of each on one another
- Disposal market
* Market relationships between metals (ex: Cd and Zinc)
* Market absorbency of product's recycled metal
While this thesis shows that industrial ecology of metals is not a useful classification for end-
of-life markets, it is not arguing that all industrial ecology typologies are not useful.
Generalizing industrial ecology may have benefits in terms of increasing the discipline's
predictive capacity, but generalization must be done with care.
5.5. Implications for Public Policy
As mentioned in section 4.5., heterogeneous and complicated opportunity costs make
general treatment of recycling systems very difficult. Correspondingly, it is very difficult to
create policy that can handle recycling systems generally. Experience with RCRA
corroborates this observation. RCRA is a broad reaching policy that affects many different
material types and a vast array of products. The case studies show that specifying RCRA
recycling rules across metal-intensive products would not be an appropriate policy
classification. The Battery Management Act served as a model in the sense that it addressed
a specific product in a specific context (NiCd batteries in the recycling market).
Limited available policy options imply need for statutory reform. The Battery Management
Act needs to be amended so that the US EPA can have a more active role in administering
and overseeing Chaige Up To Recyde! One possibility includes a tax mechanism that penalizes
battery manufacturers for not achieving predetermined recycling rates. For example, RBRC
publicly claimed that they could achieve a 70% recycling rate. Currently, they are at least 40
percentage points below this goal, which would be subject to taxation under a new policy.
Successful implementation of a tax policy would require sophisticated monitoring capacity.
(Tietenberg 1992) INMETCO's "front door" would be a plausible point to keep track of
returned batteries, and industry shipment can give a reasonable estimate of NiCds entering
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the consumer market. However, calculating recycle rates requires subjective determinations
of turnaround time and consumer retention. An adequate monitoring scheme would have to
be planned very carefully. (Lankey 1998)
Perhaps the most drastic changes would occur in administrative regulation of automobile
recycling systems. For example, the government could specify minimum recycled content of
certain alloys in automobiles. This could correspond with the 80% recyclable goal set by the
PNGV. Increasing the demand for alloy recycling could serve as a useful incentive to
change firm behavior in the recycling system. However, such regulation would be a
significant divergence from the government's traditional stance on regulating product
characteristics (usually only done where public health impacts are concerned). A more
feasible incremental change might be to use the government's procurement power to
purchase AIVs that are engineered for maximum recycling.
In the same way that policy capacity must be enhanced, both cases showed the need for
more accountability built into policy implementation. The tax scheme proposed above is
one financial measure to increase accountability. However, the Battery Management Act
should also provide for non-financial accountability, such as five-year reviews by the US
EPA submitted to a Congressional Sub-Committee. There should be a formal forum for
public concern to praise or criticize recycling rate progress of Clwge Up To Reyde! Currently,
RBRC has the ability to co-opt discussion on NiCd recycling because it can make
unsubstantiated claims about future performance without having to be accountable to
previous performance commitments.
Accountability is difficult to build into the AIV recycling case because industry has made
much less binding targets. While they agreed to design an 80 miles-per-gallon car that is
80% recyclable, there were no commitments to actually producing the cars. This is a
reflection of the partnership process, where the lack of government ability to mandate
product specifications limits their bargaining power in negotiating PNGV goals.
Finally, policies should be sensitive to different industry conditions as mentioned in section
4.5. The most immediate policy appropriate for the NiCd case is a negative tax (subsidy) on
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recycled cadmium from INMETCO. It should be an adjustable tax set so that price remains
constant, thus stabilizing operations and giving better incentives for customers to return
their batteries. (Lankey 1998) The AIV case is complicated by the recycling system's sheer
size, diffusion, and lack of existing regulatory oversight. Certain industry actions may be
appropriate, such as mergers and acquisition. Government policy could assist expedition of
this process. An extreme policy could be supporting a regulated monopoly consolidation,
but this course of action would require significant deliberation. The most important policy
implication of the automobile recycling industry structure is that direct government
intervention should not disturb transaction efficiency already built into the system.
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APPENDIX 1 - Figure 4.2. Descriptive Econometric Matrix for NiCd Take Back
A B C D E F G H I J K
A - Retailer Shop Shelf Price of
(as seller) Operation Battery
B - Last User Cost of Battery Opportunity Satisfy Need to Satisfy Need
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Information
+ + _ _ __ _ _
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APPENDIX 2 - Figure 4.4. Descriptive Econometric Matrix for AIV Recycling System
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